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ZEN AND THE ART OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: A
TAX LAWYER'S ACCOUNT OF ENLIGHTENMENT*
Gwen T. Handelman**
Our reason, which is supposed to make things more intelligible, seems to be
making them less intelligible.'
INTRODUCTION
Newly arrived in academe from practice, I came across a problem posed in
a casebook2 that shattered the illusion of crystal clarity of the terms of Inter-
nal Revenue Code ("Code") section 1015(d)(6), 3 a provision that affects the
calculation of taxable gain on the disposition of property acquired by gift."
Language that had guided me firmly in prior calculations became equivocal
when applied to a transaction apparently not contemplated by the drafters.
Although I wondered if any well-advised client would engage in such a trans-
* "What follows ... should in no way be associated with that great body of factual
information relating to orthodox Zen Buddhist practice." R. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF
MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE (1989) (author's note).
** Assistant Professor, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Lexington, Virginia;
B.A., 1968, J.D. 1981, University of Michigan.
So many people were involved in the development of this Article that the process had something
of the character of a barn raising. I began to labor on resolving the ambiguity of Internal Revenue
Code § 1015(d)(6) with my tax students. Then my colleagues joined in the endeavor in a faculty
colloquium. As I gathered my thoughts in writing, colleagues and students offered comments on
drafts. All advanced the clarity of my expression and challenged my reasoning while encouraging
my pursuit. I owe special thanks to Mary Lou Fellows, Roger Groot, Mark Grunewald, John
Handelman, Lash LaRue, David Millon, David Saltzman, and Becky Womeldorf. I also wish to
express my appreciation to the Frances Lewis Law Center for financial support.
1. R. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE 117 (1989).
2. J. FREELAND, S. LIND & R. STEPHENS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION 185 (5th ed. 1985). For a discussion of the problem, see infra note 122
and accompanying text.
3. I.R.C. § 1015(d)(6) (1988).
4. Gain or loss on the sale of property generally is determined by deducting the taxpayer's
"basis" in property from the proceeds on sale. Id. § 1001. Section 1015(a) generally assigns to the
donee a basis in property acquired by gift equal to the basis in the hands of the donor; subsection
(d) allows an increase to the donee's basis for gift tax paid on the gift; and paragraph (6) of
subsection (d) limits the increase. Id. § 1015. Discussion of the implications of § 1015(d)(6) for
depreciation is beyond the scope of this paper. For such a discussion, see Collins, Basis-of Prop-
erty Transferred at Death Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 28 MERCER L. REV. 917, 950-52
(1977) (providing a hypothetical numerical example which explores a situation involving deprecia-
ble basis calculated under § 1015(d)(6)).
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action,5 I set out to solve my own masochistic variation on the hypothetical for
sport. Practitioners likely would regard such an exercise as academic. I sus-
pect that academics, on the other hand, would view my concern with clarifying
the terms of a technical tax provision as practice-bound. My struggles with
this problem suggested to me, however, the interdependency of the practi-
tioner's and academic's spheres of inquiry, which appear increasingly
alienated.7
I began this exercise with my feet still quite firmly planted on the paths I
had followed in practice. The "plain meaning" of the words having evaporated
upon application to the hypothetical transaction, and no judicial or administra-
tive ruling having defined the words with the precision required to resolve the
ambiguity, I attempted to interpret the words by reconstructing "legislative
intent." My reconstruction relied principally on inferences of purpose drawn
from application of the words in a context where the meaning was "plain."
But jurisprudential poltergeists leapt at me from the pages of law reviews: Is
legislative intent a myth? 8 Is interpretation inescapably subjective?9 Is lan-
guage hopelessly indeterminate?10 I found myself grappling with competing
concepts of law and the limits of human understanding, calling to mind the
title of a book that I had never read, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Mainte-
nance,1" which captured my sense of absurdly juxtaposing the sublime and the
mundane.
Despite some vertigo, I felt compelled to address these questions because, if
I am to continue to train tax lawyers, the statutory construction skills I hope
to impart should follow from propositions about law and life, which, if not
demonstrably valid, I can propose comfortably, albeit tentatively. 2 This Arti-
5. See Osgood, Carryover Basis Repeal and Reform of the Transfer Tax System, 66 COR-
NELL L. REV. 297, 300-01 (1981) (analyzing potential tax implications of the transfer of a vaca-
tion home from a wealthy man to his children).
6. The authors of the casebook stop short of suggesting how one might choose among alterna-
tive readings. See J. FREELAND, S. LIND & R. STEPHENS, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY
THE FIFTH EDITION OF CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION 54-56 (1985).
7. 1 quote from an undated memo addressed to me by my research assistant, David Saltzman,
who spent the summer of 1989 reading articles relevant to this paper: "I frequently wonder what
is the goal of reviewing these obscure law periodical articles. Some are directed at such a narrow
audience that one must be a member of the author's personal cabal to make sense of his/her
jargon." Memo from David Saltzman to Gwen T. Handelman (1989) (copy on file with author).
8. See, e.g., Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870-72 (1930) (arguing
that the idea of a single will for a collective body of legislators is incoherent).
9. See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 BU.L. REV.
204, 207-08 (1980) (noting that one's experience, values, and understanding of social norms nec-
essarily color interpretation).
10. See, e.g., Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 391 (1982) (stating that
"[tlhere are as many plausible readings of the United States Constitution as there are versions of
Hamlet").
11. R. PIRSIG, supra note 1.
12. "All interpretive theories must ultimately be grounded in a political theory and a theory of
law, even if the interpreter is unwilling to recognize or state the underlying premises." Aleinikoff,
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cle begins by sketching a framework of propositions that satisfy that modest
criterion. Tentativeness is appropriate given the massive bodies of learning,
including linguistics and philosophy, in which neither I nor most of us in the
legal profession have been more than minimally schooled. Nevertheless, we
must proceed with our daily tasks, and, within the limits of our understanding,
proceed in accordance with propositions that make sense to us.
Part I of this Article offers my view that a tax adviser resolving statutory
construction issues unaddressed by administrative or judicial authority is
bound to conform the interpretation to legislative intent if the interpretation is
to be advanced on a tax return as "law." I distinguish positions reported as
law from arguments as to what a judge might or should decide the law to be,
which may be reported pursuant to a taxpayer's right to litigate liability
before payment but, I believe, should be disclosed as litigating positions.'" For
present purposes, I need not explore how modest or brazen the courts-or law-
yers proposing interpretations for consideration by courts-should be in devi-
ating from legislative intent. My view of the tax adviser's duty is premised on
a definition of law as politically authorized decisions. Lacking political author-
ity in our own right, tax advisers construing the "law" should be obligated to
bind ourselves to the legislatively authorized meaning. Thus, we should under-
take a good faith review of the evidence of legislative intent. This includes the
language employed and the structural and historical context as suggested by
the available sources, including legislative records.
I believe that many have overstated the difficulty of ascertaining the legisla-
tively intended meaning of statutes in an effort to demonstrate the logical ne-
cessity of, as opposed to normative justification for, judicial discretion in statu-
tory interpretation. 4 Often, what is really at stake is whether judicial
interpretation should be constrained by legislative intent. I distinguish inten-
tionalist technique from intentionalist legal theory. The problem with overstat-
ing the indeterminacy of language and intentionalist analysis is that such ar-
guments provide equal justification for judges, who are politically authorized
to render legally binding judgments, and private practitioners, who are not
politically authorized decisionmakers but whose interpretation of statutes may
have the practical effect of determining the incidence of government benefits
and burdens. For example, when a lawyer advises a client to take a position on
a tax return without disclosing that there is doubt as to the application of the
statute to the client's circumstances, under the self-assessment system of taxa-
Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 20, 31 (1988). But see Eskridge & Frickey,
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 321-22 (1990) (arguing
that practical reason is preferable to an interpretative approach "inspired by grand theory").
13. Handelman, Constraining Aggressive Return Advice, 9 VA. TAX REV. 77 (1989); see infra
notes 36-45 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the, lawyer as tax adviser).
14. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 407, 438
(1989) (distinguishing his "conceptual or logical" argument from evaluation of "the appropriate
distribution of power"); see D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Stat-
utes?, 75 VA. L. REv. 561, 595 (1989) (recognizing that "it is invariably more persuasive to argue
that something 'is' the case rather than to argue that something 'ought to be' the case").
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tion, the lawyer's judgment generally becomes the law applied.
I believe that there are convincing normative arguments which justify judi-
cial discretion in statutory interpretation, as well as practical constraints on a
judge's public decisions that do not extend to a lawyer's private lawmaking.
The dangers posed by an absence of constraints on lawyers defining civic
rights and obligations range from anarchy at one extreme to dictatorship of
the privileged at the other.15 Therefore, my aim is to find a way to ascertain
the legislatively intended meaning of statutes in order to prevent lawyers from
substituting their own version of legislation. Even if the tax adviser's practical
power is unique, the magnitude of the benefits and burdens allocated under
the federal tax system and the extent to which that system defines the rela-
tionship between the citizen and the federal government justify inquiry into
how that power may be exercised responsibly-that is, made accountable to
the public. I suspect, however, that most lawyers from time to time exercise
similar practical power advising clients with respect to the requirements of
state and federal statutes in circumstances where review of the lawyer's inter-
pretation by a politically authorized decisionmaker is either unlikely or long
delayed.16
As explained in Part II, I equate legislative intent with the legislatively au-
thorized meaning of the words of a statute. Despite pervasive linguistic ambi-
guity, I conclude that "plain meaning" analysis has a place in statutory inter-
pretation when, despite a diversity of culturally plausible associations, a word
has a single plausible application in a particular context.17 However, in a con-
15. I see the latter as the most real. Lawyers can serve an essential function by shielding clients
from government power. However, it seems that those best represented by lawyers are those who
exercise the greatest degree of private power, perhaps because public power is most threatening to
those who have the most to lose. But private power threatens those without it. Cf. Fiss, The Law
Regained, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 254 (1989) (observing that "[law is important, indeed indis-
pensable, but perhaps not as important and not as indispensable as it was for blacks during the
civil rights movement (or as it is today for the movement to secure the rights of gays and
lesbians)").
My colleague, David Millon, observes that the constraints offered by the norms and practices of
interpretive communities may address the threat of anarchy but do not address the specter of
oligarchy. Cf. S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COM-
MUNITIEs 338-55 (1980) (recognizing that "an interpretive community ...is interested rather
than neutral"). Moreover, conventionalist constraints may preclude general anarchy, but do not
bind interpretation sufficiently to allow for the degree of certainty and uniformity required to
administer the federal income tax consistent with the principle that similarly situated individuals
(calibrated generally by ability to pay) should be treated similarly. See Topolnicki, The Pros Flub
Our Third Annual Tax-Return Test, MONEY, Mar. 1990, at 90, 90 (reporting that 50 accountants
produced 50 conflicting bottom lines for the same return), Thus, our tax system becomes increas-
ingly anarchical.
16. Due to my limited familiarity with practice in other substantive areas, I will not venture a
definition of other circumstances in which a lawyer's advice would be subject to similar
constraints.
17. Cf. Dascal & Wroblewski, Transparency and Doubt: Understanding and Interpretation in
Pragmatics and in Law, 7 L. & PHIL. 203, 218 (1988) (observing that there "are cases in which
the combination of linguistic and factual knowledge is such that pragmatically there is no doubt"
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text where a word has more than one culturally plausible application, the
practical effects of a statute may differ depending upon whether reader or
author supplies meaning. Whether the drafter employed a word in a specific
sense is an issue of historical fact, and the extent to which the drafter's intent
has been accorded legislative authority is also an historical fact.
Often, legislative intent will not be ascertainable, but I posit that, realisti-
cally defined, legislative intent is not a myth; and, more often than is generally
acknowledged, sufficient probative evidence is available for legislative intent to
be reliably identified. The legislative intent "identified" necessarily will be a
construct of the interpreter's perceptions, and so it will be "subjective." I con-
cede that the reader's values and context will inevitably shape interpretation.
However, I hope to sensitize lawyers to our responsibility to examine critically
our own perceptions. I propose a more disciplined inquiry into legislative intent
than that offered by analysis that takes the form of speculating on how, given
a statute's purpose, the drafter would have wanted the statute to apply in un-
contemplated circumstances. Framing the endeavor as an inquiry into the
meaning of words to the drafter as an historical fact refers the interpreter to a
relevant "other's" experience, an external-and in that sense, objective-point
of reference to constrain definition of meaning.
I offer as illustration my construction of section 1015(d)(6),' 8 a statutory
provision that appears to be clearly articulated, but that is revealed to be am-
biguous in particular circumstances. I propose that these circumstances pre-
sent a case where "the text alone will produce doubt, but a careful considera-
tion of the context, structure, purpose and legislative history . '.. will lead to a
single conclusion."19 I think that, for lack of care, circumstances that reveal
the ambiguity of language generally are too readily assigned to the class of
"hard cases"-that is, where contextual considerations are inadequate to elu-
cidate the drafter's meaning.
Part III examines section 1015(d)(6) first in the context of an easy case, a
factual context in which "plain meaning analysis" is appropriate because the
reader's and the author's application of the words can be presumed to coincide
because of the absence of a plausible alternative. I then posit a part-gift, part-
sale transaction,20 which raises to the surface the ambiguity of the terms of
section 1015(d)(6). Part IV claims to reconstruct an historic "legislative in-
tent" with sufficient precision and reliability to resolve the ambiguity of the
as to meaning); Sunstein, supra note 14, at 423 (observing that when interpretive norms are
widely shared, they are "invisible" and not an object of controversy, and meaning can be said to
be "plain").
18. I.R.C. § 1015(d)(6) (1988).
19. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 460 (differentiating both those instances where "the text, to-
gether with widely shared [invisible] background norms, will be unambiguous"-classic easy
cases-and those instances where text and "contextual considerations will be unhelpful" and the
interpreter "must resort to more conspicuous background norms"-hard cases).
20. A part-sale, part-gift is a transfer of property for less than full consideration, motivated by
donative intent. See M. ROSE & J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 6.06, at 307 (3d ed.
1988).
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terms.of the statute in the context of a part-gift, part-sale transaction. To so
conclude, I must dispute the existence of conditions that make hard cases hard
and so necessarily dispute that these conditions are inevitable.
I. THE INTERPRETIVE ROLE OF THE TAX ADVISER
While the great debates in legal academia tend to focus on judicial interpre-
tation, I wish to address the interpretive role of the practicing lawyer, and the
tax lawyer in particular, who is a primary consumer of statutory material. A
lawyer may undertake to interpret tax statutes for a variety of reasons, but the
tax lawyer's principle preoccupation is ascertaining positions to be reported
(sooner or later) on a return. Under the self-assessment system, this amounts
to deciding "law" if the position is not disclosed as questionable. Thus, the
mundane task of interpreting a technical tax provision necessarily requires
adopting a definition of law.
My definition of law is unabashedly positivist: I know law when I see it, not
by its content, but by its source. My interpretation of section 1015(d)(6) rests
on a definition of law as the product of a politically authorized decisionmaker.
The object of my endeavor to construe section 1015(d)(6) was to determine
legal responsibilities and entitlements. Any authority that the words of the
statute possess to bind us to a course of conduct or afford legal protection is
attributable to the authority of their source.2 The statute itself cannot be
"law" because words have no meaning apart from human agents.21 Words can
have meaning only with reference to the sense in which they are employed by
the author,23 the sense in which they are understood by the audience to which
21. Cf. J. LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Govern-
ment, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 141, at 380-81 (P. Laslett ed. 1960) (arguing that
people cannot "be bound by any Laws but such as are Enacted by those, whom they have Chosen,
and Authorised to make Laws for them" (emphasis in original)); Kay, Adherence to the Original
Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U.L. REV.
226, 246 (1988) (observing that "only certain people have the authority to make law").
22. I would concur that "[t]he words represent the law." Sunstein, supra note 14, at 427 (em-
phasis added). However, that is not to say that the words are the law, which is the textualist's
view. See Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 375
(discussing the concerns implicated by the use of legislative history rather than the words of the
statute itself). Professor Sunstein implies elsewhere that he endorses textualism to a certain ex-
tent. He states, for example, that legislative "purposes are expressed through and have no life
independent of statutory words." Sunstein, supra note 14, at 427. Sunstein also states that "the
words rather than the intent survived the procedures of article i." ld. at 430. Lastly, Sunstein
argues that "Congress enacts statutes rather than its own views about what those statutes mean;
those views, while relevant, are not controlling unless they are in the statute. The words, not the
'intent' represent the law." Id. at 431. In view of Professor Sunstein's recognition that the words
have no acontextual or preinterpretive meaning, -id. at 416-18, he must recognize that some
human agent's intent as to meaning is controlling, 'that is, must be "in the statute," but that not
every legislator's subjective purpose is part of the context that defines the relevant meaning.
23. I do not understand Professor Sunstein's assertion that "statutory terms ... have no mean-
ing before or without interpretation" to mean that he excludes the speaker from the comminica-
tion. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 416. Rather, I understand him to recognize that both the
speaker's and the reader's meaning are functions of culture and context. Others, however, do
616 [Vol. 40:61 1
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they are directed, or the sense in which they are understood by a detached
observer of the attempt at communication between the two. Thus, the issue
becomes whose meaning, author's or reader's, is "law"; that question can only
be resolved by a positivist with reference to who (one, neither, or both) has
authority to decide law. 24
The issues that logically follow from this definition of law are whether, and
to what extent, an interpreter defining law can and should allow legislative
intent to constrain statutory interpretation. I conclude that the answer to the
normative issue depends upon the purpose and political status of the inter-
preter; the answer to the conceptual issue depends upon the probity of the
available evidence and the abilities and attitude of the interpreter. Because
there is no point to considering whether legislative intent can constrain inter-
pretation unless it should, I consider the latter first.
Whatever content might be poured into the words of a statute, what makes
the product of an interpretation "law" is that it represents a politically author-
ized judgment."' Leaving aside questions of the legitimacy of our political sys-
appear to exclude the speaker. S. FISH, supra note 15, at 65 (suggesting that the word "meaning"
should be discarded since it involves the notion of "a message" or "point" and stating that the
meaning of an utterance is "its experience"); Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 57 (stating that "the
statute 'means' nothing until it takes its place in the legal system, until it begins to interact with
judges, lawyers, administrators, and lay people").
24. Some would accord the status of "law" to the reader's meaning when the meaning is
"clear." See Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power.- The Case for a Modified
Intentionalist Approach. 63 TUL. L. REV. 1, 22 (1988) ("When the message conveyed by [statu-
tory) words is sufficiently clear, citizens should have a right to rely on that message-even if the
message deviates from the actual understanding of the legislature."). If the meaning is clear,
presumably the author and reader assign the same meaning to the words, and thus the author's
meaning can govern. If there is a diversity of meanings, then the meaning cannot qualify as
"clear," and some political theory must be found for allowing the reader to supply content to
"law."
25. Cf. Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 35 (attributing to Hart and Sacks the view that interpret-
ing statutes with reference to legislative intent is the "only way for the result of interpretation to
be called 'law' "); D'Amato, supra note 14, at 562 & n.6 ("positivism tells us that law is a com-
mand" of legislatures and the judiciary); Maltz, supra note 24, at 7 (objecting to public choice
theory on the ground that "interest groups themselves have no legal authority to enact legisla.
tion"); White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 415, 441
(1982) (stating that interpretation of a legal text "always requires that the interpreter answer the
question ... [wlho are you when you claim this meaning for the text?"). But see D'Amato,
Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1 (1983) (defining law with reference to "what the law
means to the average person: a prediction of official behavioral reaction to what she plans to do (or
avoid doing)"). This is not, of course, the average person's definition of law, as anyone who has
ever taught a first-year law school class can attest.
It is a lawyer's definition, based on Justice Holmes' "bad man's" view of law. Holmes'
definition seems to look to predicting the incidence of state force, or the incidence of
government benefits and burdens. But Holmes does not concern himself with predict-
ing actual enforcement because his bad man is highly risk averse, taking as the guide
to conduct what judges, politically authorized decisionmakers, are likely to decide,
without taking into account the prospects of getting caught. Thus, Holmes' definition
is ultimately consistent with a definition of law as the product of the judgment of
politically authorized decisionmakers. Holmes' point was that what the courts will
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tern for purposes of addressing lawyers (for most of whom, presumably, this is
not an issue), it is hardly controversial to posit that Congress is politically
authorized to make tax rules. Therefore, the content supplied to the words of a
statute by legislative will-"legislative intent"-is law. But I reject the pro-
position that only the content supplied by legislative will is law. In sum, under
certain circumstances, the reader also has political authority to define law.
Contrary to those who espouse a hierarchical model of the relationship
among the branches of the federal government based on legislative
supremacy, 6 I have found persuasive the arguments of those who recognize
the judiciary as a coequal branch of government, engaging in lawmaking
jointly with Congress.2 7 I share the view that Congress and the federal courts
properly exercise not independent, but cooperative, lawmaking authority: roles
decide cannot be determined by mechanical application of doctrine, and in that sense
he was concerned with practical consequences.
Handelman, Counseling Ordered Liberty: Reply to a Commentary, 9 VA. TAX REV. 781, 784 n.l 
(1990) (citation omitted). For further discussion of Holmes' view of law, see Holmes, The Path of
the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1897); Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV.
787, 826-36 (1989).
The solipsistic view of law (what will happen to me if I do this?) ignores that law is a social
product, necessary to social existence, as well as the political theory that is conventionally consid-
ered to undergird our system of government, under which law incorporates collective judgments
about the conduct of collective life through collectively authorized decisionmakers. See Cornell,
Two Lectures on the Normative Dimensions of Community in Law, 54 TENN. L. REV. 327, 330
(1987) (concluding that "the deep problem of modernity is to reconcile the rise of modern individ-
uality (including the formal, legal recognition of the person separate from social role) with a new
'higher' form of Sittlichkeit" (community)).
26. See Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 533-34 & n.2 (1983); Es-
treicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi's Uncommon Common Law for a Statutory Age,
57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1165-72 (1982); Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEo. L.J. 281 (1990); Maltz, supra note 24, at 11; Michelman, Bringing the Law
to Life: A Plea for Disenchantment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 356, 366 (1989); Posner, Legal Formal-
ism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 179, 189-90 (1986); Starr, supra note 22, at 373.
27. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); H. HART & A.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent.
ed. 1958); Aleinikoff, supra note 12; Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1982);
Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987); LaRue, Statutory
Interpretation: Lord Coke Revisited, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 733, 754-55 (1987); Llewelyn, Remarks
on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950); Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 279 (1985); Radin, supra note 8; Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1989); Sunstein, supra note 14.
Some of these writings include statements that implicitly endorse the hierarchical view, such as
that courts should follow legislative will when statutory language is clear. See, e.g., Aleinikoff,
supra note 12, at 22 (stating that "[in our system of government ... an interpreter's job is to be
faithful to the legislative will"); Eskridge, supra, at 1483 (stating that "[wihen the statutory text
clearly answers the question . . . it normally will be the most important consideration); Moore,
supra, at 321 (stating that the best evidence of legislative intent is a statute's ordinary meaning).
However, all note instances when obeying legislative will would be wrong in some sense, such as
when circumstances have changed, and provide justifications for judicial discretion to deviate from
historic legislative intent, whether or not it can be ascertained.
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that follow from a division of labor that assigns to Congress the task of enact-
ment and to courts the task of interpretation.28 If judges themselves have au-
thority to contribute content to law, legislative intent may be a factor in judi-
cial interpretation of statutes, but need not determine the interpretation. I
would not bind courts to the proposition that only interpretations that conform
to historic legislative intent are entitled to be called "law."
While few defend the authority of judges to impose their private views as
law to the extent accorded legislators,29 many recognize that judicial interpre-
tation may rest on "public values" (of which there seem sufficient variety to
cover every private view) 30 drawn from sources beyond the text (or historical
context) of the statute at issue, whether in the guise of assumptions of reason-
able legislators, 31 constitutional constraints, 2 or traditional 8 or evolving social
norms.3 4 In any event, those who do not accept the legitimacy of judicial reli-
ance on extratextual values will be the first to argue that judges routinely act
as if they possess independent lawmaking authority, and thus interpret statutes
in a way that would be appropriate only if they were politically authorized to
incorporate extraneous values.35 For present purposes, agreement on this point
is sufficient because I believe I can safely retreat to uncontroversial ground in
asserting that lawyers lack independent political authority and, thus, that a
lawyer's definition of "law" should be constrained to content supplied by an
authorized decisionmaker.
Lawyers perform many functions other than defining law, including propos-
28. See Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation. 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1011
(1989) (observing that "Blackstone's Commentaries, a leading source of legal theory when the
Constitution was drafted and adopted, presented a multifaceted approach to statutory interpreta-
tion that had little to do with legislative intent").
29. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(stating that courts must reconcile competing political interests in some cases, but not on the basis
of the judge's personal policy preferences); see also Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation. 34 STAN.
L. REV. 739, 763 (1982) (arguing that "adjudication requires that there exist constitutional values
to interpret," and condemning imposition "by the current winners in the processes prescribed by
the Constitution" of "individual morality, or even worse ... individual interests"). But see Dwor-
kin, supra note 27, at 545 (arguing that judges approach legal interpretation with their own "legal
philosophy" which includes "structural features," such as doctrinal history, and "substantive
claims about social goals and principles of justice"; since goals and principles vary, judges may
interpret law differently).
30. Cf. Llewelyn, supra note 27, at 401 (noting that canons of construction represent value
judgments and that each has an opposite).
31. See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 27, at 1415-16 (stating that a statute may be inter-
preted by inferring its purpose from the context of its enactment).
32. See Eskridge, supra note 27, at 1497-1538 (exploring the substantial role public values play
in "dynamic" statutory interpretation and discussing constitutional constraints).
33. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 408-10 (discussing the traditional statutory interpretation
"camps").
34. See Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 47-61 (proposing that statutes be read as if they "had
been enacted yesterday" and an attempt to make sense of statutes should take into account social
values and mores of today rather than at the time of enactment).
35. Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 544-51.
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ing candidates for the status of law to authorized decisionmakers. In this role,
lawyers need not conform interpretations of legal texts to a source of authori-
tative will. Indeed, a primary function of lawyers is to employ our skill to
question authority. If a return position is to be advanced pursuant to a tax-
payer's right to litigate tax liability before payment and identified as such, the
advised position is proposed as a candidate for the status of law. Lawyers may
also be asked to anticipate official reaction to certain conduct. Lawyers partici-
pating in a predictive endeavor bring, to the task whatever considerations we
think may influence an authorized decisionmaker56 However, a lawyer defin-
ing with a client a return position to be routinely reported (that is, without
disclosure that there is an issue as to whether the reported position is in accor-
dance with law) is serving in neither of these capacities. Rather, both the tax-
payer and the lawyer are engaged in determining the existing rights and duties
of the client under the Internal Revenue Code without the benefit of an au-
thoritative dispute resolution process.
Ordinarily, neither a client nor a lawyer need distinguish the task of predict-
ing consequences from the task of determining existing requirements, because
their individual judgments can be expected to be tested against actual official
reaction before they will determine the incidence of government benefits and
burdens. Legal enforcement normally follows from the decision of an author-
ized decisionmaker. But the self-assessment system contemplates that positions
reported on a tax return will be reported in accordance with the terms of the
Internal Revenue Code. Consistent with this presupposition, premised on the
legal obligations imposed by the Internal Revenue Code,37 return positions are
not routinely reviewed and so generally will determine the incidence of govern-
ment benefits and burdens. Thus, articulating a routinely reported return posi-
tion requires defining law rather than predicting official reaction because, gen-
erally, none is expected (or the reaction is expected to be ministerial only). A
lawyer advising return positions to be reported without disclosure is rendering
decisions that generally will be enforced under the self-assessment system. Be-
cause our political system does not designate private individuals as authorized
lawmakers, tax advisers are bound, in defining law, to conform interpretation
of the terms of a statute to the meaning assigned by a politically authorized
decisionmaker. A tax adviser can only legitimate a definition of the scope of a
client's civic obligations and entitlements under a tax provision with reference
to a politically authorized judgment.
Thus, I would describe the task of statutory interpretation as undertaken by
36. As Professor Hazard has stated:
A judge can resolve an issue of law only by reference, implicit or explicit, to some-
thing more than the text of the law itself; if the issue was plain, there would be
nothing for the judge to decide. . . . And the lawyer has to go along with the judge's
path of thought, arriving at the destination before the judge does whenever possible.
Hazard, Communitarian Ethics and Legal Justification, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 721, 723-24 (1988).
37. Section 1 of the.Internal Revenue Code sets forth the regular income tax rates for individu-
als. See I.R.C. § 1 (1988). Section I I sets out the corporate rates. See id. § I1. Reporting require-
ments'are set forth in I.R.C. §§ 6001-6115.
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a tax adviser as different from that undertaken by the lawyer predicting prac-
tical consequences and from the judge who is authorized to render legally
binding judgments. Lawyers lack the authority to import extraneous values
into interpretation, and so the tax adviser cannot satisfy the obligation to con-
form interpretation to a politically authorized judgment by hypothesizing judi-
cial results. That would necessarily require undertaking to duplicate judicial
interpretation: "giving meaning to the law that it does not already have by
recourse to some normative reservoir beyond the law itself." 38 I cannot justify
the authority of lawyers acting within a confidential relationship, whose work
product goes routinely unreviewed by other interested parties or a disinterested
tribunal, to enjoy the discretion exercised by the judiciary" in circumstances
where the lawyer's word becomes "law"-the circumstances of a self-assess-
ment system. In the absence of judicial or administrative authority, legislative
will is the sole source of politically authorized judgment in which to ground
interpretation and should, therefore, determine which of the alternative mean-
ings of the statutory terms counts as law. The lawyer's task in interpreting
words that neither judges nor administrators have defined is to identify the
legislatively authorized meaning, unless the taxpayer is prepared to disclose on
the return that the reported interpretation is a litigating position.4
Thus, I question the prevailing definition of the nature of a lawyer's proper
function when advising return positions.4 1 The ethical guidelines of the Ameri-
can Bar Association ("ABA") direct the tax adviser to predict likelihood of
success in litigation42-in other words, to construe a statute as the lawyer con-
templates a court would .4  Congress has recently agreed to define minimum
standards of return advice in these terms." I agree with the implicit premise
38. Hazard, supra note 36, at 724.
39. To the extent that Professor Fish suggests that the circumstances of judicial decisionmaking
operate as constraints, I am in full accord. See Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation
in Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 551, 562 (1982); see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note
12, at 384 (commenting that Justices display the ability "to rise above their personal
prejudgments").
40. Thus, I employ the concept of " 'speaker's meaning,' which is central for the pragmatics of
conversation." Dascal & Wroblewski, supra note 17, at 214. An interpretive approach that fo-
cuses on speaker's meaning asks the interpreter to look for common ground between the inter-
preter and speaker (through the text), not "search for common ground between interpreter and
text." Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 323 (emphasis added) (citing HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (D. Linge trans. 1976); HANS-GEORG GADAMER, THE
IDEA OF THE GOOD IN PLATONIC-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY (C. Smith trans. 1986); HANS-GE-
ORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (G. Barden & J. Cumming trans. 2d ed. 1975)).
41. See Handelman, supra note 13, at 80-93.
42. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985), re-
printed in 39 TAX LAW. 631 (1986).
43. The prevailing definition of the tax adviser's task as predicting judicial outcomes appears to
be based on Holmes' definition of law. See supra note 25. "[But i]t is quite a stretch ...to use
his views to support the notion that the incidence of government benefits and burdens are or
should be within the discretion of private practitioners." Handelman, supra note 25, at 784 n. I.
44. These standards have been defined in penalty legislation. I.R.C. § 6694 (West Supp. 1990)
(imposing penalty on adviser if understatement of a client's tax liability is attributable to an ad-
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that judges are politically authorized decisionmakers and, therefore, that their
decisions are law. I do not believe that lawyers can arrive at law by imitating
actual judicial decisionmaking. It is likely, however, that the ABA's articula-
tion of the lawyer's role, reflected in the preparer penalty provisions,4 5 is pre-
mised on a vision of the judicial role that incorporates the hierarchical view of
the relationship between Congress and the courts. In that case, current profes-
sional standards presume deference to legislative intent in statutory interpreta-
tion, and my interpretive approach may not be substantially more demanding
than that required to satisfy minimum ethical obligations and avoid preparer
penalties.
II. INTENTIONALIST TECHNIQUE
The equipment traditionally recommended for excavating legislative intent
is the analytical framework prescribed by Lord Coke4 and popularized in An-
glo-American legal thought by the likes of Blackstone' and Hart and Sacks.'
Lord Coke's advice can be divided into two parts. First, an interpreter should
apply a statute so as to promote its "reason""9 (recast as "purpose" by Hart
and Sacks). 50 Second, to discern the statute's reason (or purpose), the inter-
preter should consider four historical matters: (1) the law before the statute,
(2) the "mischief" not provided for under prior law, (3) the remedy provided
(the statutory provision), and (4) why the legislators thought that the particu-
lar remedy was responsive to the rischief.51 Lord Coke beckons to an analysis
that focuses on what can be learned about the thinking of the drafter as an
historical fact. 52 It has been observed that Lord Coke's framework for ascer-
taining statutory purpose calls upon the interpreter to attend to con-
text-implicitly taken into account in everyday conversation and often essen-
tial to effective communication.5" For purposes of employing the legislative
context to assign meaning to the words of section 1015(d)(6), I found Lord
Coke's legacy essential when attendance to linguistic and cultural context
proved inadequate.
vised position "for which there was not a realistic possibility of being sustained on its merits" that
was not disclosed).
45. Id.
46. See Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584).
47. See I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *87.
48. See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 27, at 1411.
49. Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. at 638.
50. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 27, at 1411.
51. LaRue, supra note 27, at 745-49.
52. Professor LaRue has characterized Lord Coke's advice as directed to answering questions
about the use of legislative history: "how do we use this rich body of evidence? what questions do
we pose to the records?" Id. at 739.
53. Id.; cf Sunstein, supra note 14, at 426 (stating that sometimes "reliance on purpose will be
a valuable way of providing a context within which to understand statutory terms"); Wald, Some
Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOwA L.
REV. 195, 199 (1983) (noting that "words mean different things in different contexts"),
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Equally useful is the presupposition, implicit in Lord Coke's prescription, of
a genuine effort to understand the statutory purpose from the drafter's per-
spective. 4 This calls upon the interpreter to assume a cooperative attitude that
might be described as good faith. Cooperation entails distinguishing one's own
preconceptions and attempting to adopt the drafter's point of view, so that
"the message (will be] less susceptible to radical reinterpretation."55 An other-
directed attitude is essential to accurate reconstruction, namely, communica-
tion.56 The preconceptions that must be abandoned include one's own associa-
tions with words read to have a "plain meaning," as well as one's own views of
good policy or the interest of a client." The interpreter must both attend to
context, including the circumstances in which the drafter functioned, and iden-
tify with the drafter to reconstruct the associations of words to the drafter.5 8
The accuracy of the reconstruction depends in part upon the quantity and
probity of the available evidence. If the meaning of a legal text is the "will-
content [voluntas legis] of the historical lawmaker . . . the search for the
54. LaRue, supra note 27, at 753 (interpreting Lord Coke to have instructed interpreters "to
look at the problem from the point of view of the legislator" and "examine the pre-existing law
from the point of view of the legislator and not from [the interpreter's] own point of view").
Professor LaRue's interpretation recognizes limitations on the extent to which Lord Coke advises
judges to adopt the legislative perspective, but neither addresses nonjudicial interpretations.
55. D'Amato, supra note 14, at 592; see Burton, Judge Posner's Jurisprudence of Skepticism,
87 MICH. L. REV. 710, 716 (1988) (advocating impartiality in the form of the exclusion of ad
hominem considerations). Professor D'Amato focuses on how legislatures might attend to the ju-
risprudential assumptions of the audience to frame a statute to "fall on 'friendly' ears ('friendly'
in the sense of likely to adhere to the intent of the legislators who enacted the statute)." D'Amato,
supra note 14, at 593-94. 1 focus on how the theory of legislative sovereignty is logically inconsis-
tent with the notorious unfriendliness of the audience to which tax statutes are addressed. My
approach could properly be described as "disinterested," but hardly "impersonal." See Levinson,
supra note 10, at 383 (describing the Harvard Law School approach to interpretation). The object
of the enterprise is to establish a connection with something outside myself, and the product of my
interpretation will depend on with what or whom I make that connection. See Cornell, supra note
25, at 330 (advocating an "understanding of law as the nomos of the community that is 'other' to
the individual"). Different interpreters applying themselves to the task of connecting with the
same "other" are much more likely to agree than if they look inward. Cf Eskridge & Frickey,
supra note 12, at 382 (noting that "it is striking how .much common ground differently situated
interpreters can find, if they genuinely throw themselves into the interpretive process").
56. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the words "communicate" and "community"
are both derived from the same stem as the Latin verb, communicare: to make common to many,
to share, to impart, and to divide. 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 577, 581-82 (Clarendon Press
2d ed. 1989). "Communicate" evolved toward meanings of giving, sharing, imparting, and trans-
mitting. Id. at 577. "Community" came to denote a recognizable group of individuals with certain
common characteristics, such as shared ideas. Id. at 581-82. Completing a communication re-
quires focusing on commonness. As Levinson has noted, "What is at stake is a conception of the
possibility of a shared moral life." Levinson, supra note 10, at 401.
57. Cf. Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Adviser, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 412, 417 (1953) (stating
that in deciding what the law is, "the tax adviser must put aside . . . personal notions of tax
policy and . . . mental prepossessions").
58. Cf. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 800, 817-22 (1983) (proposing an approach to statutory construction in which judges
would imagine how legislators would apply the statute to an individual case).
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meaning in question ought to use all means relevant for reconstructing that
will." 59 No evidence should be ignored, but all should be evaluated.6" The
quality of the evaluation will depend upon the acumen and attitude of the
interpreter in drawing inferences.6' There's the rub. Although I am without
political authority to define law, I am an indispensable party to interpretation.
"[Tihe author's 'intention' seems to constitute another text."62 Whatever I
"reconstruct" will be the product of my own mind. However I might wish to
harmonize my perception with that of politically authorized decisionmakers, I
am limited by my separateness. On the other hand, however I might wish to
resist sharing the drafter's perspective, I am bound by the irresistible force of
shared linguistic, cultural, and professional conventions.63
In all my experiences with communication, I function somewhere between
perfect harmony and total resistance, but experience affords me some confi-
dence that I can distinguish with considerable reliability between perceptions
(of harmony or the reverse) that I can trust and those I cannot. Because "good
faith" is a prerequisite to communication, I attempt a type of reality testing of
the harmony of my interpretation with the drafter's meaning by defining the
interpretive task as a variety of fact-finding, attentive to the available evi-
dence. " In defining the interpretive role of the lawyer, I break with Lord
Coke's advice to judges to the extent that he prescribed that the evidence of
purpose serve as the basis for an analogy to the case at hand.6 5 When purpose
analysis is formulated as an endeavor to "think [one's] way as best [one] can
into the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have
wanted the statute applied,"66 the discipline of a fact-finding endeavor is aban-
doned.67 This approach may be faithful to Lord Coke's advice and appropriate
59. Dascal & Wroblewski, supra note 17, at 205.
60. Graft, "Keep Off the Grass," "Drop Dead," and Other Indeterminacies: A Response to
Sanford Levinson, 60 TEX. L. REV. 405, 408 (1982) (stating that "the degree to which we can be
confident about our inferences [of meaning] depends upon the amount of evidence available, evi-
dence which is itself open to criticism and may well be fallible"); Note, Philosophy, History, and
Judging, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 181, 184 (1988) (defining the historian's role as making a
"critical choice" about "facts," including treating statements of historical figures not as true or
false accounts of facts but as "evidence").
61. Note, supra note 60, at 189-92 (describing philosophers' views of history as subjective).
62. D'Amato, supra note 14, at 561; see Schanck, An Essay on the Role of Legislative Histo-
ries in Statutory Interpretation, 80 L. LIBR. J. 391, 398 (1988) (observing that in many circum-
stances "it will become necessary to infer a purpose from circumstantial evidence").
63. S. Fis", supra note 15, at 94, 338-55 (observing that the extent to which people are capable
of separate identity is limited by membership in communities); Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1325, 1345 (1984) (concluding that "the condition of free subjectivity . . . could never
obtain").
64. See Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 1237,
1246 (1986) (stating that the "fundamental assumption of the model of history as description is
that good history can accurately portray past reality").
65. See LaRue, supra note 27, at 748-49.
66. Posner, supra note 58, at 817.
67. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 433 (distinguishing between "backward-looking" and "for-
ward-looking" reconstruction, the latter involving a process of attempting to "bring forward" the
1991] STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 625
for politically authorized decisionmakers, but such an approach to characteriz-
ing legislative intent is, indeed, "an act of creation rather than discovery."6 8 I
define the endeavor as employing the evidence of reason as context that will
contribute to my understanding of the words of the statute as used by the
drafter and applying that meaning to the case at hand. Unanticipated cases
can be resolved if the drafter's use of the words was relatively precise.69 I
cannot be as certain of the accuracy of my reconstruction of the drafter's
meaning as I am that the object that I think I perceive behind my desk sup-
ports my weight, but the process I engage in to come to each conclusion is
much the same."0 If the drafter's intent is relevant to interpretation, I believe
that I am more justified in proceeding on the assumption of the correctness of
sensory and cognitive data that have acquired a reputation for reliability in my
experience than I am in ignoring the evidence. 71
Due to the impossibility of reconstructing the mental states of the multiplic-
ity of legislators responsible for enactment of any given statute, legislative in-
tent has been labeled a fiction and purpose analysis a fraud by a variety of
strange bedfellows. 7 2 But this critique ignores the historical fact that the words
were written and written purposively. 7s The words of a statute may have been
the product of one mind or several, but certainly of some mind(s) and cer-
tainly not the minds of all the members of Congress who voted to enact them.
The author is not the "aggregate mind"; the author is one or more individuals
who, as a matter of historical fact, chose to employ particular language. When
a small group works in concert, agreement on the meaning of the words to
which they are directing their attention is not only possible, but likely, and
"the intent of the drafter," whether a single individual or a group, is an histor-
legislature into the present to consider the case).
68. Id. at 427; see Brest, supra note 9, at 221 (concluding that "[w]hen the interpreter engages
in this sort of projection, she is in a fantasy world more of her own making than of the adopters'
making").
69. Thus, I do not believe uncontemplated circumstances to be the defining attribute of the
hard case.
70. See Graff, supra note 60, at 405 (noting that "even the visible 'furniture' of the world is
insubstantial, for the language we use to describe that world segments it in culturally conditioned
ways").
71. See Burton, supra note 55, at 717 (concluding that action must be taken on a balance of
reasons without certain knowledge since the system could not otherwise operate on a practical
basis); cf. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 380-81 (questioning the assumption that " 'real'
knowledge, if it exists, must rest on unquestionable foundations" and advocating that interpreters
look, not to decide what "is 'true' in any foundational sense, but [to] seek agreement that is
useful, workable, or satisfies whatever other practical criteria seems applicable"); Kay, supra note
21, at 243 (noting that "[allmost every decision we make and action we take is based on a judg-
ment of probabilities, often as to the probable meaning of what we read and hear").
72. See Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 25; Dascal & Wroblewski, supra note 17, at 209; Easter-
brook, supra note 26, at 547; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 326; Levinson, supra note 10,
at 379; Radin, supra note 8, at 869-71; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 433.
73. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 27, at 1156. The end may be to implement a "deal," but
the activity is nevertheless directed to some purposeful end. See Posner, supra note 58, at 820
(recognizing the "compromise" as the "purpose").
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ical fact. The individuals who chose the statutory language may not have been
elected representatives 74 but a realistic definition of "legislative intent" must
begin with recognition of the role of the drafter, although a drafter without
political authority cannot define law. Enactment by majority vote of elected
members of Congress is prerequisite to a constitutionally valid statute. There-
fore, ratification of the drafter's intent by the enacting legislators would be
necessary for the drafter's intent to represent a politically authorized
judgment.7 5
Plain meaning analysis frequently seems to proceed on the assumption that
legislators can be presumed to have understood, and thus enacted, words with
reference to their plain meaning.76 But I must introduce, in addition to the
views set forth below on the limitations of plain meaning analysis, the observa-
tion that legislators frequently do not read the words of a statute at all, 77 and
this is most particularly true of technical legislation.78 Realistically, legislators
likely understand most tax legislation as bearing the meaning that the drafter
ascribes to the words.7 9 It is to that person or that person's supervisor that
74. J. HARRIGAN, POLITICS AND THE ERICAN FUTURE 241 (1984); R. PYNN, AMERICAN
POLITICS: CHANGING EXPECTATIONS 541 ,2d ed. 1984); cf. T. CONLAN, M. WRIGHTSON & D.
BEAM, TAXING CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF TAX REFORM 244 (1990) (quoting Ways and Means
Committee member remarking, "If I had really wanted to influence the way the actual law was
written, I would have applied for a job on the Joint Tax or Ways and Means staff."). See gener-
ally M. MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES: CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND THE FUTURE OF
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1980).
75. Cf. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 327 (noting that views expressed in committee
reports and floor statements of sponsors or floor managers represent legislative intent "only if
legislators in general agree with, or at least acquiesce in, the views of the few actively involved in
the passage of the legislation").
76. Maltz, supra note 24, at 22-27; Starr, supra note 22, at 375; see Wald, The Sizzling
Sleeper.- The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the
United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 277, 282 (1990) (citing Green v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
77. See Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 679-81 (1990) (commenting
on fictions underlying Justice Scalia's textualist apl~roach); Wald, supra note 53, at 200 (observ-
ing, based on her experience as a legislative liaison, that "many proponents will not have read or
understood the bill"). Publicly available evidence on this point is scarce, but an unusual example
was recounted by the Joint Committee on Taxation staff director from 1964-76. He recalled ex-
plaining the 1976 tax legislation to Senator Packwood prior to the Senator's cataract surgery
when "[r]eading amendments to the Internal Revenue Code was out of the question." M. MALBIN,
supra note 74, at 171. My experience suggests that even the vast majority of lawyers consider
reading Code provisions "out of the question" as a general proposition.
78. Cf. T. CONLAN, M. WRIGHTSON & D. BEAM, supra note 74, at 244 (noting that "the vast
scope and comprehensive structure of the [1986 tax] reform plan overwhelmed legislators and left
enormous numbers of issues to be decided by staff"); J. HARRIGAN, supra note 74, at 241 (discuss-
ing tension between necessity of reliance on experienced staff with respect to "technically compli-
cated" matters and responsibility of members to electorate); Wald, supra note 76, at 307 (observ-
ing that "the typical representative votes on a complex statutory scheme without reading either
the full bill or the legislative history, such as committee reports; and that in voting 'yes' he or she
intends to give approval to and put imprimatur on both the language of the statute and the pro-
cess that produced it" (emphasis in original)).
79. As Judge Wald has noted:
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legislators turn to clarify the terms of a measure in the relatively rare in-
stances in which there are questions as to whether or to what extent to defer.80
As a practical matter, committee reports, which translate legislation into more
readily accessible English (but may serve other, less public-spirited functions
as well 81), are likely to be more widely read. 82 Even so, I suspect that commit-
tee explanations are more probative of the drafter's thinking than that of the
enactors.
In view of the realities of the legislative process, I define "legislative intent"
as the meaning the drafter(s) of the statute assigned to the words to the extent
that members of Congress acquiesced in that meaning, and so accorded legis-
lative authority to the drafter's meaning. Ascertaining whether and to what
extent the enacting legislators ratified the sense in which the drafter(s) em-
ployed the terms of a statute must be the subject of a separate factual inquiry.
Some balk at recognizing that a legislative subgroup, congressional staff,
administration officials, and even lobbyists may enjoy legislative authority.
The committee is the "work place" of the Congress. Members of the committee, to
whom the bills are referred and to whom the task of sifting the dross from the gold is
delegated, act as "agents" of the rest of the members; they are supposed to put the
legislation in shape, take care of the details of draftsmanship, and be familiar enough
with the technicalities and policies to explain it to the rest of the body.
Wald, supra note 53, at 200 n.48; see also T. CONLAN, M. WRIGHTSON & D. BEAM. supra note
74, at 244 (suggesting that the 1986 "tax reform was enacted because a majority of participants
wanted to do what was right, and they relied on the experts to define 'right' for them"); S. MAC-
MANUS, C. BULLOCK & D. FREEMAN, GOVERNING A CHANGING AMERICA 312 (1984) (stating
that "Congress ratifies more than 90 percent of the recommendations of its committees"); R.
PYNN, supra note 74, at 541 (quoting senator acknowledging that "[in all legislation, [staff are]
the ones that lay out the options"); Maltz, supra note 24, at 26 (stating that committee reports
are "strong evidence" of legislative intent and preplanned statements by a bill's floor manager
should be "almost equally authoritative"); Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987
DUKE UJ. 380, 385 (noting that generally the only meaningful discussion of legislation occurs in
committee). But see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 327 (arguing that "any theory of
interpretation that formally gives conclusive weight to the views of a legislative subgroup is in
tension with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of article I") (citing INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983)). These observations either are inapplicable if the enacting legislators acqui-
esced in the views of the subgroup or lead to the conclusion that the committee system has re-
sulted in a substantial body of invalid legislation. Chadha does not come "close" to this conclu-
sion. See Wald, supra note 76, at 307 (warning that "to second-guess Congress' chosen form of
organization and delegation of authority, and to doubt its ability to oversee its own constitutional
functions effectively . . . runs the risk of violating the spirit if not the letter of the separation of
powers principle").
80. See R. DAVIDSON & W. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 254 (2d ed. 1985) (noting
that "[s]taff aides commonly accompany committee members to the floor to give advice [and]
draft amendments").
81. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 327 (noting practice of inserting explanations in
committee reports to relieve pressure from interest groups); Mikva, supra note 79, at 385 (refer-
ring to use of "committee reports to engage in horse trading and logrolling"); Wald, supra note
76, at 284 (observing that Justice Scalia's mistrust of explanations in reports not "altogether
unfounded"). The practice of manufacturing legislative history is a factor in considering the pro-
bity of explanations in ascertaining legislative intent.
82. Maltz, supra note 24, at 26.
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However, to banish realities of the legislative process from interpretive meth-
odology is to abandon intentionalism and concede to interpreters, even those
with no claim to political authority nor pretense of serving the public interest,
discretion to adopt the fiction that best serves their purposes. The realities of
the legislative process may suggest a justification for judges, who are politi-
cally authorized decisionmakers, to substitute their own views for the product
of the legislative process. However, that justification does not extend to indi-
vidual lawyers serving individual interests in the privacy of a confidential rela-
tionship removed, from politically authorized decisionmaking processes. If it is
disturbing that I acknowledge that political power may be wielded by
unelected participants in the legislative process, it should be more disturbing
to contemplate usurpation of that power by lawyers without congressional
authorization. 3
My identification of the legislatively authorized meaning of section
1015(d)(6) begins with the "plain meaning" of the words and rests on infer-
ences drawn from the plain meaning as applied in certain contexts. Therefore,
I must meet the objection that language is indeterminate. An example of this
genre of objection is provided by a response to the suggestion that the constitu-
tional provision requiring that the president have attained age thirty-five does
not suffer from the malady of open texture that afflicts such expressions as due
process . 4 Sanford Levinson observes that age requirements may refer not only
to chronological age, but also, for example, to a level of intellectual maturity
associated with those who have attained that chronological age." Thus, the
83. 1 am indebted to Professor Farber for engaging me on this point. Letter from Daniel A.
Farber to Gwen T. Handelman (Mar. 12, 1990) (commenting on earlier draft of this paper) (copy
on file with author).
84. See Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 404-06 (1985) (suggesting that the
nature of language is an important factor in separating easy cases from hard cases); accord
Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1207 (1985). Professor Schauer
illustrates the point by substituting a hypothetical clause specifying only that officeholders must
"have reached an age representing sufficient maturity to perform the duties requisite to the of-
fice," for the existing language articulating the age requirement. Schauer, supra, at 405. He notes
that, while the hypothetical clause substantially alters the words of the existing clause, the hypo-
thetical clause does not necessarily represent a substantially different intent. Id. However, Profes-
sor Schauer observes that the relatively vague language of the hypothetical clause would en-
courage litigation, while the relatively precise language of the existing clause has excluded the age
requirement from debates over constitutional theory. Id. at 404. Professor Schauer concedes that
the "open texture" of language, which he describes not as vagueness but as the possibility of
future vagueness, is not eliminable. Id. at 423. Even so, Schauer maintains that in easy cases, such
as the constitutional age requirement, language is sufficiently precise and determinant, considering
what we know about the world. Id. Thus Professor Schauer concludes that "language can and
frequently does speak with a sufficientl clear voice such that linguistically articulated norms
themselves leave little doubt as to which cesults are consistent with that command." Id. at 416.
85. Levinson, What Do Lawyers Know (And What Do They Do With Their Knowledge)? Com-
ments on Schauer and Moore, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 441, 450 (1985); see Peller, The Metaphysics
of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1174 (1985); Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative
Veto, 68 MINN. L. REv. 473, 532-33 (1984); see also Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 536 (ac-
knowledging that "we cannot be certain whether [the constitutional age requirement] means
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meaning of the words is not "plain" because their meaning might be called
into question in determining the eligibility of an individual who had attained
the chronological age of thirty-five but has a pre-adolescent mental age. How-
ever, Levinson has eschewed the argument that the words are indeterminate
because the sounds and marks that comprise them mean nothing in themselves
(and, thus, potentially anything).86 He accepts that words have meaning be-
cause of culturally transmitted understandings and limits his exploration of
the meaning of the words of the Constitution to culturally plausible alterna-
tives.87 His point is that "equally competent speakers of the native language"
sometimes disagree. 88
Words serve to distinguish particular elements of human experience from
the rest, to carve out a portion and present it for consideration.89 The complex-
ity of human experience, however, undercuts the efficacy of words in particu-
larizing, and words can be more or less effective in limiting their experiential
referents depending upon the context.90 To cast the discussion in terms that
are minimally value laden, I refer to the television game show "The $100,000
Pyramid," where contestants are asked to identify the category that includes
all the examples the contestant's partner offers to suggest the category. The
program demonstrates that people conceptually subdivide experience this
way.9" For example, we can separate any number of "Things That Have At-
tained Age Thirty-Five" from other "things" in our experience. Our judgment
would not be acontextual, but the context is expansive. The things we classify
as having attained age thirty-five are likely to have chronological age in com-
mon, but may be associated with vastly different additional attributes.92 A
thirty-five-year-old office building is one thing, a thirty-five-year-old horse
quite another. As we limit the context, the portion of experience carved out by
thirty-five as the number of revolutions of the world around the sun, as a percentage of average
life expectancy ...or as a minimum number of years after puberty").
86. Professor Levinson rejects the idea that because language is indeterminate, words cannot
communicate meaning. He observes that he would not write an article if he did not have a "belief
that [his words] would help to communicate something to an audience." Levinson, supra note 85,
at 442.
87. While Professor Levinson believes that one can read statutory, language in any possible
number of ways, he identifies the task of statutory interpretation as discussing only readings that
are possible given the present legal culture. Id.
88. Levinson, supra note 10, at 395.
89. Graff, supra note 60, at 405.
90. LaRue, supra note 27, at 734-36 (identifying four contexts to which an interpreter might
refer to narrow the meanings of words in a statute: linguistic context, context of daily practice and
custom, context of preexisting common law, and legislative context).
91. Psychological research with infants shows that the tendency to categorize is "very power-
ful." Gilbert, Research Challenges Established Views of Cognitive Development, LSA MAGAZINE
(University of Michigan), Fall 1989, at 31 (quoting Assistant Professor of Psychology Susan A.
Gelman).
92. There are cases in which the combination of linguistic and factual knowledge is such that
pragmatically there is no reasonable doubt that x belongs to A or that x does not belong to A, as
well as cases in which such a question is undecidable by any amount of combined linguistic and
factual knowledge. Dascal & Wroblewski, supra note 17, at 218.
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the words "age thirty-five" may shift radically. The contestant asked to guess
the category that includes thirty-five-year-old horses may well focus on as-
sociations-"accesory" ideas 3-- other than chronological age, such as extreme
physical frailty."' The words identifying the chronological age of the horse
refer to a multiplicity of other associations, perhaps more salient. Those of us
who might find ourselves at a racetrack would likely readily wager against an
entrant described as a thirty-five-year-old horse and would be mightily sur-
prised to find the animal in prime physical condition. Despite our precise com-
prehension of the reference to chronological age, such an animal would not
correspond to the mental image the words evoked. Such an animal is not what
we mean when we refer to thirty-five-year-old horses, no matter what its
birthdate9 9 So, "age thirty-five," as applied to human beings, is a concept that
carries multiple cultural associations: physical, emotional, and intellectual at-
tributes associated with that chronological age in our culture.9" The specifica-
tion of age thirty-five as a minimum age requirement, as a matter of cultural
association, refers to a variety of attributes, which for purposes of illustration,
I shall limit to chronological age and intellectual maturity today associated
with age thirty-five. 7 The language initially appears determinate98 because in
our experience those attributes normally coincide. The distinction between
chronological age and intellectual maturity is blurred when considering the
eligibility of a thirty-five-year-old individual who has the intellectual capacity
our culture normally has associated with that age.99 The circumstances to
93. Id. at 207.
94. See H. WARING, HORSE BEHAVIOR 144 (1983).
95. "[Slometimes the best interpretation . . . is one that runs counter to its apparent literal
meaning-even if the author did not have in mind the case at issue, or make a judgment about
how the case should be resolved." Sunstein, supra note 14, at 419 (citing example of whether a
World War II tank on display is a "vehicle" that is not allowed in a park and Ludwig Wittgen-
stein's example of whether "gaming with dice" was included in a request to teach children a
"game"); see D'Amato, supra note 14, at 568-70 (discussing the "folly" of "literal interpreta-
tiori"); Wald, supra note 53, at 199 (noting that "the literal meaning [of a statute] may be inap-
plicable or nonsensical").
By age two, children understand that "if a thing is a member of a category, it shares important
characteristics with other members" and, "more startling . . . that the important characteristics
of a category may not be on the surface-that they might include an underlying 'essence' or
hidden characteristic." Gilbert, supra note 91, at 31.
96. Moreover, the content of these associations in American culture today may vary from their
content 200 years ago. Cf Levinson, supra note 10, at 375 n.9 (noting differences between British
and American uses of the same words).
97. In the context of "The $100,000 Pyramid," age was not value laden, but as a minimum age
requirement for eligibility for public office, the associations with age 35 do assume value signifi-
cance; and thus, more visible background norms are included in the context and ambiguity is
increased. "Context-dependency . . . is one of the features of language which can either restrict
or enhance the doubts that can arise in concrete situations and lead to an interpretive process."
Dascal & Wroblewski, supra note 17, at 217.
98. See Schauer, supra note 84, at 405 (describing the language of the constitutional age provi-
sion as sufficiently determinate to call interpretation of language an easy case).
99. But see Posner, supra note 58, at 818 (stating that the constitutional age requirement does
not invite judicial construction "to recast the provision so that it reads, the President must be
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which- the words are applied do not require choosing between, or even recog-
nizing, the culturally plausible alternatives. It is as applied in such contexts
that the words can appear to have a "plain meaning" even when, as in this
instance, the words "literally"100 refer to but one, and perhaps the less salient,
attribute of the image they evoke. 101 This is an "easy case," not because the
meaning of the words is clear, but because there is a coincidence of culturally
plausible associations with the concept "age thirty-five" in these circum-
stances.10 2 Words can be simultaneously indeterminate, in the sense of carry-
ing multiple meanings, and determinate, in the sense of achieving in specific
circumstances community accord on a referent. Thus, it is possible for mem-
bers of a community to communicate with one another without a precise un-
derstanding of what the other "really" means.
Although I obviously consider the term a misnomer, I use the term "plain
meaning analysis" to refer to interpretation that ignores culturally plausible
alternative meanings of words. Because meaning is not inherent in the marks
and sounds that make up words but is culturally assigned, any reading of a
text, including a "plain meaning" approach, necessarily involves a variety of
interpretive acts to situate the marks and sounds in a cultural context. Inter-
preting a tax statute includes resort to a mental dictionary that comprehends
tax terminology and identification of the tax meaning as appropriate. Plain
meaning analysis does not address whether these interpretive moves are made
in the interests of understanding the speaker's meaning or the reader's. Is re-
sort to professional conventions appropriate because they provide a window on
authorial intent since the context (a tax statute) suggests that words are em-
ployed in that sense by the author? Adoption of common professional usage as
meaning may instead establish content from the perspective of the professional
community of readers and risk excluding the speaker from the communication.
These interpretive acts, however, cannot meaningfully be described as exer-
cises of the reader's subjective discretion. °' Given the force of professional
either thirty-five or mature"). According to Judge Posner, a court could not justify such an inter-
pretation as based on the framers' intent, but would be limited to the "obvious" meaning, not
because the words are plain but because, read in context, the words yield one meaning. Id. at 819.
100. "The notion of 'literal' meaning is a crude one. It usually refers to the meaning of words
in 'most' contexts, but because meaning is a function of context, it is wrong to suggest, as the
concept of 'literal meaning' does, that words have context-independent meanings." Sunstein, supra
note 14, at 419 n.41.
101. See Dascal & Wroblewski, supra note 17, at 219 (observing that one cannot decide a
priori whether a term is clear or not); White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 415, 417 n.3 (same). For example, the term "man" "has not been
traditionally considered fuzzy. Fuzziness, however, appeared with the technological capability of
keeping human organisms 'alive' with no cerebral activity." Dascal & Wroblewski, supra note 17,
at 219.
102. See Dascal & Wroblewski, supra note 17, at 211-12 (recognizing "clarity ... as a prag-
matic feature of a legal text used in a concrete situation rather than an absolute property of the
text itself"). Words that appear inherently ambiguous, such as "due process," have a visibly "rich
variety of connotations." Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 342.
103. S. FisH, supra note 15, at 14 (observing that assignment of meaning by members of an
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conventions that likely operate on both author and reader, this process is anal-
ogous to speaking a dialect in a locale where that is the native tongue. 04
Plain meaning analysis has considerable utility in facilitating coordination
of social activity. It is indeed easier to ignore alternative meanings when noth-
ing of any practical significance turns on the distinction. "At some point of the
process an interpretation is produced that does fit the case at hand, i.e., that is
no longer contextually inadequate. Such an interpretation is then 'clear
enough' in so far as the particular use of the text is concerned, and no further
search is reasonably needed."'0 8 Due to shared cultural assumptions, author
and reader can be presumed to agree on the practical application of words in
such circumstances.10 Statutes are written to communicate directions to the
populace and their legal advisers. Plain meaning analysis avoids time consum-
ing and controversial inquiries into whether the sense in which the words were
written can be ascertained and whether that meaning can or should control
interpretation. The length and complexity of my construction of section
1015(d)(6) suggests the impracticality of such inquiries where there is agree-
ment on the application of the words despite a diversity of views on the as-
sociations carried by the words.
I begin my construction of section 1015(d)(6) with a plain meaning analy-
sis, understanding the plain meaning in the context of a professional culture.
The tax practitioner likely observes professional conventions without conscious
awareness, but for the benefit of the reader for whom tax English is a foreign
language, I offer an introduction.
III. SECTION 1015: AN INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most titillating description of "basis" is as the amount that a
taxpayer can receive tax-free on the sale of property (conversely, the amount
over which proceeds from sale of the property constitute taxable gain). 0 7 Code
section 1012108 assigns the cost of property as its basis; other Code sections
prescribe different basis rules for property transferred without consideration in
money or money's worth or, to call upon the ancient formulation, in considera-
interpretive community does not "proceed from an isolated individual but from a public and con-
ventional point of view").
104. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 414 n.24 (commenting that "[p]articipation in the set of
practices that make ordinary words intelligible is probably best conceived of not as interpretation
but as understanding").
105. Dascal & Wroblewski, supra note 17, at 215-16 (emphasis in original).
106. As Judge Wald has observed, the Supreme Court has been inclined to test the presump-
tion of agreement between author and reader against evidence of intent in the legislative record,
and at least a cursory review suggests that the presumption is warranted by experience. Wald,
supra note 53, at 195-99; cf. Kay, supra note 21, at 242 (observing that practical experience
demonstrates that "[mlost of the time our confidence [that speaker and listener have understood
the practical application of words to be the same] is justified").
107. I.R.C. §§ 1001(a), 101l(a) (1988).
108. Id. § 1012.
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tion of love and affection, which does not count." 9 However the basis of prop-
erty is initially determined, section 1016 authorizes assorted adjustments, to
account for certain post-acquisition events, such as increases for improvements
and decreases for depreciation deductions taken. 110
Code section 1015 offers a complex of rules to govern the calculation of a
recipient's basis in property acquired by inter vivos gift. Generally, section
1015(a) assigns to the recipient a "carryover" basis equal to the transferor's
adjusted basis,"' and section 1015(d)(1) directs the recipient to increase the
carryover basis by any gift tax paid on the transfer." '2 Section 1015(d)(6)(A)
limits the increase, for gifts after 1976, to the amount of gift tax that is pro-
portionate to "net appreciation," defined under subparagraph (B) as the value
of the gift in excess of the donor's adjusted basis."13
Neither section 1012 nor section 1015 specifically addresses transactions
with both gift and sale characteristics (a transfer for less than full considera-
tion)," 4 but the regulations under section 1015 fill the gap. Those regulations
provide that the transferee in a part-gift, part-sale transaction assumes a basis
equal to the greater of cost or carryover,".. to which is added "the amount of
increase, if any, authorized by section 1015(d) for the gift tax paid.""' For
transfers after 1976, the increase is limited by section 1015(d)(6)." 7 As Inter-
nal Revenue Code provisions go, section 1015(d)(6) appears to be a clearly
109. Id. §§ 1014, 1015.
110. Id. § 1016 (West Supp. 1990).
11I. Id. § 1015(a) (1988). Before enactment of the predecessor to § 1015(a), the donee's basis
in property acquired by gift was equal to its market value at the time of the transfer. This was
consistent with the policy, reflected by § 102, to exclude the value of gifts from gross income.
However, because the transfer of property acquired by gift ordinarily did not trigger realization of
the appreciation to the donor, the effect of assigning a market value basis to the donee was to
exclude permanently the appreciation from taxation either to the donor or the donee. Section
1015, by assigning a carryover basis to the transferee, reflects a congressional judgment to subject
the appreciation to tax, but, for better or worse, to permit the tax liability to be shifted from the
donor to the donee upon the donee's disposition of the property rather than tax appreciation to the
donor at the time of the gift. See Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470 (1929); M. GRAETZ. FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 185 (1988); S. SURREY, P. MCDANIEL, H. AULT &
S. KOPPELMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 169 (succ. ed. 1986) [herein-
after S. SURREY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION]; Wurzel, The Tax Basis for Assorted Bargain
Purchases, or: The -Inordinate Cost of "Ersatz" Legislation, 20 TAX L. REV. 165, 178 & n.45
(1964).
112. Section 1015(d)(I)(A) reads, in relevant part:
[For property] acquired by gift on or after September 2, 1958, the basis shall be the
basis determined under subsection (a), increased (but not above the fair market value
of the property at the time of the gift) by the amount of gift tax paid with respect to
such gift[.]
I.R.C. § 1015(d)(1)(A) (1988).
113. Id. § 1015(d)(6); see infra note 118 (providing the text of § 1015(d)(6)).
114. See Wurzel, supra note 11l, at 177-80 (discussing congressional lack of attention to this
issue).
115. Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4(a)(1) (1988).
116. Id. § 1.1015-4(a)(2).
117. I.R.C. § 1015(d)(6) (1988).
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communicated direction.1 8 In an arithmetic format, section 1015(d)(6)(A)
translates into the following:
increase in basis = net appreciation
gift tax paid amount of gift
Substituting the 1015(d)(6)(B) definition'" for the term "net appreciation"
yields:
amount by which fair market
value of gift exceeds donor's
increase in basis = basis immediately before gift
gift tax paid amount of gift
Consider the application of the statute to the following circumstances which
do not challenge the clarity of the statute:
Problem I. A father owns property with an adjusted basis of $100,000, and
makes a gift of the property to his son. The property has been valued at
$200,000 for purposes of assessing gift tax, which is levied on the entire
value at a rate of 39%, yielding a $78,000 gift tax liability, which the father
pays.
120
On these facts, $200,000 is both "the fair market value of the gift" and the
"amount of the gift," despite any distinction between "amount" and "fair
market value" that might be suggested in a different context. The donor's ba-
118. See id. Section 1015(d)(6) provides, in relevant part:
(A) In general.-In the case of any gift made after December 31, 1976, the increase
in basis provided by this subsection with respect to any gift for the gift tax paid under
chapter 12 shall be an amount (not in excess of the amount of tax so paid) which
bears the same ratio to the amount of tax so paid as-
(i) the net appreciation in value of the gift, bears to
(ii) the amount of the gift.
(B) Net appreciation-For purposes of paragraph (I), the net appreciation in value
of any gift is the amount by which the fair market value of the gift exceeds the
donor's adjusted basis immediately before the gift.
Id.
119. Section 1015(d)(6)(B) states that "the net appreciation in value of any gift is the amount
by which the fair market of the gift exceeds the donor's adjusted basis immediately before the
gift." Id. § 1015(d)(6)(B).
120. There is a unified rate schedule for estate and gift taxes. The rates are progressive on the
basis of cumulative lifetime and testamentary gifts. Generally, a unified credit of $192,800 is
allowed, the practical effect of which is that no tax liability will attach unless aggregate gifts
exceed $600,000. Id. § 2010. The marginal rate on cumulative gifts between $600,000 and
$750,000 is 37%; between $750,000 and $1,000,000, the rate is 39%; between $1,000,000 and
$1,250,000, the rate is 41%, etc., to a maximum marginal rate of 55% on cumulative gifts in
excess of $3,000,000. Id. §§ 2001(c), 2502(a). The first $10,000 of lifetime gifts of present inter-
ests made to any person in a calendar year is excluded from the amount subject to gift tax. Id. §
2503(b). The amount of a gift is first reduced by the $10,000 annual exclusion to the extent it has
not been exhausted by prior gifts in that year, and the amount of the tax is reduced by the
available unified credit. Id. §§ 2504-2505. Problem I assumes that the annual exclusion and the
unified credit have been exhausted.
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sis has been established at $100,000 for purposes of determining the carryover
basis under section 1015(a) and that definition is imported into the 1015(d)(6)
calculation. Members of the relevant "interpretive community" would agree
on the referents of the terms in this context.121 The tax professional readily,
even automatically, identifies, consistent with internalized professional conven-
tions, the referents of "basis," "value," and "appreciation" that are appropri-
ate in the factual and statutory context. Tax professionals would recognize no
plausible alternatives to assigning figures to the terms of the formula, as
follows:
amount by which fair market
value of gift exceeds donor's
increase in basis = basis immediately before gift
gift tax paid amount of gift
increase in basis = $200,000 - $100,000
$78,000 $200,000
increase in basis = 1/2
$78,000
Once these figures are supplied, the formula is solved by multiplying the ap-
preciation ratio (the right side of the equation) by the amount of gift tax paid
(to solve for the unknown, both sides of the equation are multiplied by
$78,000).
increase in basis = 1/2 • $78,000
increase in basis = $39,000
The son's basis in the property is $139,000: the carryover basis of $100,000
plus the 1015(d) increase of $39,000.
In the context of Problem I, only one figure is associated with each term of
the formula. However, when section 1015(d)(6) is applied to a transfer that is
part-gift and part-sale, plausible alternatives are revealed. Consider the follow-
ing hypothetical case:122
Problem II: An aging multimillionaire mother wishes to move to Florida
121. See Fish, supra note 63; Fiss, supra note 29.
122. The problem that initially inspired my curiosity posits a transfer, between relatives, of
residential realty subject to nonrecourse debt equal to less than the fair market value of the prop-
erty. See J. FREELAND, S. LIND & R. STEPHENS, supra note 2, at 185. Crane v. Commissioner, 331
U.S. 1 (1947), established that the amount of the outstanding debt is treated as consideration paid
for the property by the recipient. See id. at 13-14. Thus, the transaction can be viewed as a sale.
However, since the consideration (the outstanding debt) is less than the fair market value of the
property, and the circumstances suggest donative intent motivated the bargain sale, the transac-
tion also has gift characteristics. My hypothetical case also posits a transfer where debt assumed
by the transferee constitutes consideration equal to less than the fair market value of the property.
However, I perversely complicated the analysis by making the donor's gift tax liability the debt
assumed.
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and give her condominium to her daughter, on the condition that the daugh-
ter pay the gift tax on the transfer. The condo originally cost $50,000, which
is the mother's adjusted basis. The condo is now valued at $280,000. Gift
tax is assessed on the net amount of the gift, that is, the fair market value of
the condominium minus the gift tax paid by the daughter. The amount of
the gift tax and the amount subject to gift tax are interdependent variables
determined under an algebraic formula, 28 yielding $80,000 gift tax liability
(and establishing the amount subject to gift tax at $200,000). The average
gift tax rate is 40%. However, the highest marginal gift tax rate applicable
to the transfer is 41 %.124
The court in Diedrich v. Commissioner2' held that such a conditional gift is
a part-gift, part-sale and that the donor is taxable to the extent that the gift
tax paid by the donee exceeds the donor's adjusted basis 2 6 (allocating the
donor's basis entirely to the sale portion of the transactioh). This tax treat-
ment is consistent with Treasury regulations under Code section 1001, which
govern the amount of gain taxable to the transferor in a part-gift, part-sale
transaction. 2 7 These regulations have been criticized for failing to apportion
the transferor's basis ratably between the sale and gift portions of the transac-
tion, 28 but exploration of this interpretive issue is beyond the scope of this
123. See Rev. Rul. 75-72, 1975-1 C.B. 310; Rev. Rul. 81-223, 1981-2 C.B. 189.
124. See supra note 120.
125. 457 U.S. 191 (1981).
126. Id. at 194-200. Because the donor bears primary liability for gift tax under § 2502(c) of
the Code, the theory is that the mother receives an economic benefit in the form of relief from her
obligation to pay tax, as if the daughter paid cash to the mother, and then the mother paid the
gift tax. The Court regarded the donee's gift tax payment as taxable consideration for the prop-
erty rather than as an excludable gift made out of disinterested generosity. Id. On the facts of
Problem II, however, the mother can avoid taxation on the payment either under I.R.C. § 121
(one-time exclusion of gain from sale of principal residence) or under I.R.C. § 1034 (nonrecogni-
tion of gain from sale of principal residence applied to purchase of new principal residence).
127. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(e) (as amended in 1972). This tax treatment also corresponds with
the symmetrical basis provisions of Treasury regulations under § 1015 of the Code, which assigns
to the transferee in a part-gift, part-sale transaction the greater of cost or carryover basis. Id. §
1.1015-4.
128. See, e.g.. S. SURREY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note I 11, at 716 (stating that the
regulations allocate all of the basis in a mixed familial transfer to the sale); Warren, The Income
Tax Effects of Partially Donative Transfers, TR. & EST., Sept. 1971, at 712, 714-15 (suggesting
that the statute could be interpreted to allocate the donor's basis pro rata between the sale and
gift portions). But see Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,642 (Mar. 23, 1976) (recounting unsuccessful I.R.S.
attempts to obtain judicial approval of apportioned basis); Wurzel, supra note 11l, at 187 (same).
Treasury Regulation § 1.1001-1(e) provides, on the facts of Problem II, that the mother has
$30,000 gain ($80,000 consideration paid minus her $50,000 cost basis). The critics would allo-
cate to the sale portion of the transaction only that portion of the mother's basis in the home that
bears the same ratio to the entire basis as the consideration received bears to the fair market value
of the property, determined as follows, where "x" equals the portion of the mother's basis alloca-
ble to the sale portion of the transaction:
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Article. 129 Under the section 1015 regulations, the daughter is entitled to her
cost basis of $80,000 plus the adjustment for gift tax paid under section
1015(d), "if any [is] authorized."' 3 0 Section 1015(d)(1) authorizes an adjust-
ment "for gift tax paid" without reference to the identity of the payor, so the
words of section 1015(d)(1) could be read to permit the daughter the benefit
of the adjustment even though her gift tax payment would serve double duty
in calculating her basis: first, as establishing her cost, and then, as the measure
of the total gift tax paid. Such a result may be counterintuitive,"' but under
Diedrich, the daughter's payment of gift tax is treated as if cash were paid to
the mother and the mother paid the tax, and all the other tax consequences of
the transaction are premised on this account of the transaction. 3
But Problem II raises three questions under section 1015(d)(6), unad-
dressed by judicial or administrative ruling, that interfere with calculating the
limitation under the statutory formula. First, what is the fair market value of
x = $80,000
$50,000 $280,000
x = $80,000 .. $50,000
$280,000
x = .29($50,000)
x = $14,286
Thus, $14,286 of the mother's $50,000 basis would be allocated to the sale and the remaining
$35,814 to the gift. The mother's gain on the sale would be $65,814 ($80,000 consideration minus
$14,286 basis allocated to sale). The symmetrical basis calculation for the daughter would be
$80,000 (cost of portion of property purchased) plus $35,714 (carryover basis in portion of prop-
erty acquired by gift), for a basis in the entire property of $115,714. This approach to calculation
of a donor's gain and the donee's basis is followed in the case of a bargain sale to a charitable
organization. I.R.C. § 1011(b) (1988); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-4(c)(2), (4) & 1.1011-2(b) (1988).
129. Neither the critics' views of good policy, nor my own, should influence my interpretation
of § 1015(d)(6). See supra text accompanying notes 52-55. The regulations under §§ 1001 and
1015 were part of the legislative context in which § 1015(d)(6) was drafted. It is arguable, how-
ever, that these regulations governing part-gift, part-sale transactions between individuals direct a
result more consistent with the result contemplated by § 1015: assumption by the donee of the
income tax liability on the appreciation of property in the hands of the donor. See supra note I11.
By assigning to the donee the greater of cost or carryover basis, the § 1015 regulations provide,
on the facts of Problem ii, both that the daughter's basis will reflect her investment and that the
daughter will assume tax liability on the appreciation prior to the transfer that remains after the
mother is taxed on her $30,000 gain. Cf Note, Income Tax Consequences of Encumbered Gifts:
The Advent of Crane, 28 U. FLA. L.'REv. 935, 938 n.21 (1976).
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4(a)(2) (as amended in 1972).
131. See Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356, 361 (1968), affd. 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir.
1969). But see Warren, supra note 128, at 715, 793 (stating that the "Turner court simply over-
looked the ability of the income tax provisions to reach the transferor's gain, and in so doing came
to the wrong result"); Note, supra note 129, at 943 n.61 (stating that the Turner court "failed to
realize that the donee's cost basis is actually the grantor's basis increased by the gain recognized
by the transfer").
132. See supra text accompanying notes 122-27. In addition, the report of the Senate Finance
Committee, where § 1015(d) originated, contemplates that the donee might bear the gift tax
liability and states that "it is immaterial whether the gift tax is paid by the donor or donee." S.
REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (1958).
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the "gift"? The $280,000 gross value of the property (an amount that would
reflect the donor's cost plus the full increase in value of the property in the
hands of the donor) or the $200,000 net value transferred without considera-
tion? Although the statutory definition of "net appreciation" might more natu-
rally be read to refer to the full increase in value in the hands of the donor
(full fair market value of the property in excess of the donor's cost basis), the
statutory language is ambiguous due to the reference to the fair market value
of the "gift" (which would seem to refer to the amount received without con-
sideration). Second, is the "donor's [mother's] adjusted basis immediately
before the gift" $50,000 (the mother's cost basis), or, since the mother's basis
was allocated entirely to the sale portion of the transaction (rather than appor-
tioned between the gift and sale portions) for purposes of determining her tax-
able gain,' does the donor have an adjusted basis of zero in the "gift"?
Third, does "fair market value of the gift" here have the same meaning as
"amount of the gift"?
The left side of the equation, unaffected by these issues, is:
increase in basis
$80,000
However, depending on the answer to these questions, the right side of the
equation could be any one of seven different numbers, calculated eight differ-
ent ways:
1. $280,000 - 50,000 = (.82)
280,000
2. $200,000 - 50,000 = (.75)
200,000
3. $280,000 - 50,000 = (1.15)
200,000
4. $200,000 - 50,000 = (.54)
280,000
5. $280,000 - 0 = (1.0)
280,000
6. $200,000 - 0 = (1.0)
200,000
7. $280,000 - 0 = (1.4)
200,000
8. $200,000 - 0 = (.71)
280,000
133. See supra text accompanying notes 125-28.
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The solution to the equation, thus, could be any of the seven different amounts
set forth above, multiplied by the gift tax. However, section 1015(d)(6) limits
the increase in basis to the amount of tax paid,134 so any solution yielding a
greater amount (options 3 and 7) would be reduced to the amount of tax paid.
Thus, there are five different candidates suggested by the words of the statute
for the amount permitted to be added to the daughter's cost basis. Could the
daughter's basis equal twice her cost (the result under options 3, 5, 6, and 7)?
Yes, but I have some explaining to do.
IV. RECONSTRUCTING LEGISLATIVE MEANING
Before section 1015(d) was enacted, a donee's basis in property acquired by
gift was equal to the donor's basis ("carryover" basis). Section 1015(d) origi-
nally allowed a donee to increase the carryover basis of property by the full
amount of gift tax paid on the transfer." 5 In. 1976, subsection (d)(6) was en-
acted to limit the amount of the increase to a fraction of the gift tax paid."3 6
There is little discussion of section 1015(d)(6) in the legislative history; a sin-
gle committee report documents the amendment of section 1015(d).1s7 There
is no record, of course, as to whether the statute and the explanation in the
report were drafted by the same author(s), but because the provision and the
report were released roughly contemporaneously and from the same commit-
tee, it is likely that the authors were at least working closely with one an-
other." 8 Thus, the explanation provided in the committee report is somewhat
probative of the drafter's intent." 9 But reports are summaries. They are acces-
sible in part because they are simplifications, and thus, it is not surprising that
the report fails to provide a precise definition of the statutory terms that might
be attributed to the drafter, let alone Congress. "
The House Ways and Means Committee Report accompanying proposed
subsection (d)(6) offered rationales both for the subsection (d)(1) increase to
carryover basis and for the proposed limitation:
134. I.R.C. § 1015(d)(6)(A) (1988); see supra note 118 (providing text of §1015(d)(6)).
135. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 43, 72 Stat. 1606 (1958)
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1015 (1988)).
136. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005(c), 90 Stat. 1877 (1976).
137. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The conference report incorporated the
explanation provided by the House Ways and Means Report. See HR. CONF. REP. No. 1515,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 34-36 (1976).
138. See R. RIPLEY, CONGRESS: PROCESS AND POLICY 246-48 (4th ed. 1975); Farber &
Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423 (1988).
139. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 430. Judge (and former Congressman) Abner Mikva strongly
recommends review of committee reports:
Most of the time-not always, and not for every committee-the committee report
represents the synthesis of the last meaningful discussion and debate on the issue. The
committee report is usually drafted by the majority staff, more often than not with
substantial input from the minority on the committee.
Mikva, supra note 79, at 385.
140. Cf Wald, supra note 53, at 200 (observing that much "pertinent legislative discussion is
unrecorded or inadequately recorded").
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The purpose of the increase in basis for gift taxes paid on the gift is to
prevent a portion of the appreciation in the gift (equal to the gift tax im-
posed on the appreciation) from also being subject to income tax, that is, to
prevent the imposition of a tax on a tax. However, existing law is too gener-
ous in that it permits the basis of the gift property to be increased by the
full amount of the gift tax paid on the gift and not just the gift tax attribu-
table to the appreciation at the time of the gift."'
According to the House Report, then, an addition to basis was appropriate to
relieve the donee of a "tax on a tax," but allowing an increase equal to the full
gift tax paid was "too generous. 1 412 Section 1015(d)(6) addressed the exces-
sive generosity by limiting the increase in basis to the portion of "the gift tax
attributable to the appreciation at the time of the gift."'""
While this explanation raises more questions than it answers, it does reveal
that the increase was to equal the gift tax paid on appreciation, and thus that
"amount of the gift" is intended as a factor in calculating the gift tax rate.
The mechanism by which section 1015(d)(6) determines the gift tax attributa-
ble to the appreciation is prescribed by the formula:
increase in basis - net appreciation
gift tax paid amount of the gift
The formula can be recast as:
increase in basis = gift tax paid • net appreciation
amount of the gift
Instead of referring to the gift tax return figures and the actual rate used to
calculate the gift tax liability, the section 1015(d)(6) formula prescribes that
"net appreciation" be multiplied by a gift tax rate determined by dividing the
gift tax paid on the transfer by the "amount of the gift" (yielding the average
gift tax rate)." Therefore, the "amount of the gift" must be intended to refer
to the amount subject to gift tax.
The report, however, provides no such obvious answer to the meaning of the
statutory definition of net appreciation ("the amount by which the fair market
value of the gift exceeds the donor's adjusted basis immediately before the
gift" ). Nor does the report explain why adding the gift tax paid on the
appreciation to the donee's basis remedies the perceived mischief of a "tax on
a tax," on the one hand, and corrects the overgenerous remedy of prior law, on
the other. Indeed, the description of the mischief is more puzzling than illumi-
nating. Left unexplained is in what sense a "tax on a tax" (for income tax to
be levied on amounts equal to gift tax paid) was regarded as problematic.
Since neither gift tax nor income taxes paid are deductible from the income
141. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1976).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. I.R.C. § 1015(d)(6)(A) (1988).
145. Id. § 1014(f)(2) (West Supp. 1990).
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tax base,' 46 income tax routinely is assessed on amounts applied to pay gift
tax. If, however, in this context, a "tax on a tax" is inappropriate for some
reason, why only as to the gift tax paid on the appreciation, rather than as to
the full amount of gift tax paid?" 7
The explanation can be clarified by examining historical data, which can be
reconstructed by applying section 1015 in contexts where the meaning of the
terms is not controversial. Answers to the questions the report raises can be
inferred from a comparison of the tax consequences to the donor and donee of
gifts of property before enactment of section 1015(d), between enactment of
section 1015(d) and section 1015(d)(6), and after enactment of section
1015(d)(6)."s
Before section 1015(d) was enacted, the combined gift and income taxes
levied on a donor and donee would vary depending on whether (1) an owner of
property first sold the property, paid the income tax on the gain, gave the
after-tax- proceeds14 9 to the donee, and paid the gift tax on the gift of cash; 50
or (2) the owner gave the property to the donee and paid gift tax on the gift of
property, and the donee sold the property and paid the income tax on the
gain. '5 A discrepancy caused by differential income tax rates between the
donor and donee was to be expected under a progressive tax system. However,
a discrepancy between the combined gift and income taxes levied on the donor
and the donee existed even where the donor and donee were subject to the
same income tax rate, and the donee was left with the same amount of cash in
the end. In these circumstances, the two forms of the transaction resulted in
transfer of equivalent economic value:
Form A Form B
(sale, followed by a gift) (gift, followed .by a sale)
1. Donor sells property for x. 1. Donor gives property with fair
market value = x.
2. Donor pays income tax, y. 2. Donee sells property for x.
3. Donor transfers x-y to donee. 3. Donee pays income tax, y.
4. Donee keeps x-y. 4. Donee keeps x-y.
The discrepancy in total taxes paid was attributable to differential amounts
of gift tax paid. Greater gift tax was paid when the property itself was trans-
ferred (and gift tax was assessed on x) than when the after-tax proceeds were
transferred (and gift tax was assessed on x-y). 52 A sale, followed by a gift of
146. Id. § 275 (1988).
147. See Osgood, supra note 5, at 298 n.3.
148. See M. GRAETZ, supra note I l, at 185 n.l.
149. Here and elsewhere, the term "after-tax proceeds" refers to proceeds on sale less the in-
come tax paid on the sale.
150. I occasionally refer to this series of transactions as a "sale, followed by a gift."
151. L occasionally refer to this series of transactions as a "gift, followed by a sale."
152. The tax consequences before the enactment of § 1015(d) can be illustrated using the facts
of Problem 1, and positing that the son sells the property for its fair market value at the time of
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the after-tax proceeds thus resulted in lower total taxes and created an incen-
tive to prefer that form of transaction over a gift, followed by a sale. This
appears to be the mischief that section 1015(d) was designed to remedy.' 63
The section 1015(d)(6) limitation on the adjustment can equalize the amount
of total taxes paid, whether the donor first sells the property and gives the
donee the after-tax proceeds or gives the property to the donee who bears in-
come tax liability on the appreciation. 15 That section 1015(d)(6) has this ef-
fect raises an inference that eliminating the disparity was its intended
function.
The extra gift tax paid on the gift of property was attributable to valuing
the property at fair market value, ignoring the potential income tax liability
transferred with the property. If the property were transferred subject to a gift
tax liability, calculation of the value subject to gift tax would reflect that lia-
bility.'65 However, when the liability is for income taxes in an (as yet) unas-
certained amount, payable at an (as yet) unascertained date, and never paya-
the transfer (to eliminate differential tax consequences caused by postacquisition appreciation)
and that both father and son are subject to income tax at the 28% marginal rate (to eliminate
differential tax consequences caused by different rates). Under these circumstances, the father and
son's combined federal tax is $106,000. The father pays $78,000 gift tax at the time of the trans-
fer, and the son pays $28,000 income tax (28% multiplied by the $100,000 proceeds in excess of
the son's carryover basis). In essence, the son pays the tax from funds provided by the father
(from the proceeds on sale of the gift) and is left with $172,000 cash. If, instead, the father sold
the property, paid the income tax at a 28% rate ($28,000) from the proceeds and transferred to
his son the $172,000 after-tax proceeds, the gift tax would be $67,080 (39% multiplied by
$172,000), and the total federal tax liability only $95,080. Although the form of the transactions
varies, equal value is transferred in both cases (the son is left with $172,000). But the variation in
form results in a $10,920 greater gift tax liability when the gift is made in the form of property
rather than cash.
153. As the donor could avoid the tax on a tax by selling the property, paying any tax due on
the gain, and then making a gift of the after-tax proceeds, and as the making of a gift is not
treated as requiring the realization of appreciation on the property, it follows that the donor
should be able to make a gift of the whole property without the imposition of a tax on a tax.
Collins, supra note 4, at 949.
154. Professor Collins explains:
Section 1015(d)(6) ...achieves this by providing a basis increase equal to the gift
tax on appreciation. The effect of the increase is to reduce income from a sale by an
amount equal to the increase. The tax reduction effect of the increase is equal to the
amount of the increase times the effective income tax rate applicable to the gain aris-
ing at the time of sale. The amount of the increase is the gift tax on appreciation. The
effect of the increase, then, is to reduce income tax arising from the sale by an
amount equal to the effective income tax rate times the appreciation existing at the
time of the gift. The gift tax o[n] the income tax ultimately due is also equal to the
effective gift tax rate . . . times the appreciation existing at the time of the gift. Thus,
the basis increase results in a reduction of income taxes from the sale by an amount
equal to the gift tax that falls on that part of the property that becomes income tax.
Id.; see supra text immediately following note 121. The section 1015(d) adjustment, as limited by
subsection (d)(6), allows an addition to the son's basis equal to $39,000, which results in an
income tax saving equal to $10,920 (28% multiplied by $39,000). This exactly equals the differ-
ential in gift tax paid on the two forms of transaction discussed supra at note 152.
155. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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ble at all if the donee holds the property until death,"5 6 the potential liability is
ignored. "7 Therefore, the cause of the "mischief" under pre-1015(d)
law-differential tax consequences on transfers of equal value in different
forms-was an excessive gift tax levy on the transfer of appreciated property
because valuation of the gift failed to take account of the encumbrance on the
property equal to the income tax liability. 1 8 However, the remedy took the
form of reducing the donee's income tax (by increasing the amount the donee
could receive tax-free on sale of the property).
Section 1015(d), by allowing an increase to the donee's basis, reduces the
donee's income tax liability by reducing the donee's taxable gain. The original
section 1015(d) increase, equal to the full amount of gift tax paid, reduced the
taxable gain to the donee by an amount that resulted in income tax savings
greater than the differential in gift tax. Greater gift tax continued to be paya-
ble when the donor transferred the property itself rather than the after-tax
proceeds, but a gift of the property, followed by sale by the donee, resulted in
lower total taxes because the income tax savings exceeded the differential in
gift tax between the two forms of transaction. 56 This sheds light on the House
report's explanation that immediately prior law provided too generous an ad-
justment.'6 Completely eliminating the "tax on a tax" (excluding the full
amount of the gift tax payment from income tax) had failed. Yet partially
eliminating the "tax on a tax" achieved the desired end of yielding an income
tax saving to the donee equal to the differential in gift tax paid on the transfer
of the property compared with the transfer of the after-tax proceeds. That
differential is equal to the gift tax paid on the donee's assumed income tax
liability.
156. The heirs or devisees of the donor will be relieved of income tax liability on accrued gains
because they will be assigned a basis in the property equal to its fair market value at the time of
the donee's death. See I.R.C. § 1014 (West Supp. 1990).
157. As an illustration, the property was valued at $200,000, without regard to the "hidden"
income tax liability of $28,000 that was transferred with the property. At a 39% gift tax rate,
that resulted in excessive gift tax of $10,920. By providing for an increase in basis, § 1015(d)(6)
saves the donee this amount in income tax (by reducing the amount of gain, subject to income
tax). Section 1015(d)(6) increases the basis of the son to $139,000, and upon sale of the property
the son is subject only to $17,080 income tax (28% multiplied by the $61,000 proceeds in excess
of basis adjusted under § 1015(d)(6)), rather than $28,000. The result is a savings of $10,920 in
income tax. The combined federal taxes equal $95,080 ($78,000 gift tax paid by the father and
$17,080 income tax paid by the son), the same total amount of federal taxes paid when the father
sells the property and transfers the after-tax proceeds to the son.
The compensation does not take account of the time value of money, however. The present
value of the income tax savings may be substantially less than the $10,920 gift tax overpayment,
depending upon the interval between payment of the gift tax and payment of the income tax and
the interest rates during that period.
On the other hand, under certain circumstances, an overcompensation will result. See Collins,
supra note 4, at 950.
158. W. KLEIN, B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 162 (7th ed. 1987);
Collins, supra note 4, at 948-49.
159. Collins, supra note 4, at 948 & n.156.
160. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
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The donee's ultimate income tax liability on sale of the property will equal
the donee's income tax rate multiplied by the difference between the amount
realized on the sale and the donee's adjusted basis in the property. The portion
of that liability assumed from the donor generally will equal the donee's in-
come tax rate multiplied by the difference between the fair market value of
the gift at the time of the transfer and the donor's basis. 1 ' In other words, the
amount on which the donee assumes income tax liability can be described by
the same words used in the statutory definition of "net appreciation." Indeed,
understanding "net appreciation" as a synonym for taxable gain assumed by
the donee (calculated without the 1015(d) adjustment) explains how the statu-
tory formula achieves its end. The donee's income tax savings equals the do-
nee's income tax rate multiplied by the gift tax rate multiplied by the assumed
gain. Rearranging the factors, the income tax savings equals the gift tax rate
multiplied by the donee's income tax rate multiplied by the assumed gain; in
other words, the gift tax paid on the assumed income tax liability-namely,
the excess gift tax paid.
The drafter's reasoning can be inferred as follows. On transfer of appreci-
ated property, the donee assumes potential income tax liability on an amount
equal to the difference between the sale price that could be commanded (fair
market value ("FMV") of the property) at the time of the transfer and the
donor's transferred basis (FMV - basis). If the donor and donee are subject to
the same income tax rate," 2 the donee's assumed income tax liability will
equal the income tax the donor would have paid if the donor had sold the
property and transferred the after-tax proceeds, and thus, the value trans-
ferred will be the same as if the donor had transferred the after-tax proceeds.
Because valuation of property for gift tax purposes fails to take account of the
income tax liability the donee assumes on transfer, the property is overvalued
for gift tax purposes by an amount equal to the donee's income tax rate multi-
plied by the excess of fair market value over basis, which results in an over-
payment of gift tax equal to the gift tax rate multiplied by the donee's as-
sumed income tax liability (gift tax rate * income tax rate • (FMV - basis)).
The drafter's reasoning continues. The donee should be compensated for the
overpayment of gift tax through a reduction in income tax liability.16 There-
fore, an amount equal to the gift tax paid on the donee's assumed income tax
liability should be subtracted from the donee's income tax liability. The de-
sired result (postadjustment income tax liability of the donee) can be stated
arithmetically as follows:
161. But see Collins, supra note 4, at 950 (noting that, if the property declines in value after
the transfer, the donee's assumed income tax liability is less than the tax liability the donor would
have incurred if the donor had sold the property and transferred the proceeds).
162. See supra text immediately following note 151.
163. I have found no evidence of the drafter's reasoning to explain why compensation to the
donee was considered an appropriate remedy even when the gift tax was paid by the donor.
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income tax rate • (FMV - basis)
gift tax rate • income tax rate * (FMV - basis)
income tax liability
Tax liability can be reduced by reducing taxable gain. The donee's income tax
liability can be reduced by an amount equal to the overpayment of gift tax by
subtracting from assumed taxable gain an amount equal to the gift tax paid on
the assumed gain. This can be demonstrated arithmetically by simplifying the
arithmetic statement of the desired result by dividing both terms by the in-
come tax rate, as follows:
FMV - basis
- gift tax rate • (FMV - basis)
income tax liability
That is, for income tax liability to be reduced by an amount equal to the
overpayment of gift tax (gift tax rate • income tax rate • (FMV - basis)),
income tax should be levied on the assumed gain (FMV - basis) minus the gift
tax paid on the assumed gain (gift tax rate • (FMV - basis)).
Continuing the drafter's reasoning, taxable gain can be reduced by increas-
ing basis. Therefore, the donee's basis should be increased by adding the prod-
uct of the gift tax rate multiplied by the assumed taxable -gain, that is, in-
crease in basis = gift tax rate • (FMV - basis). The gift tax rate applicable to
the gift as a whole can be calculated by dividing the total gift tax paid on the
transfer by the amount subject to gift tax:
gift tax paid
amount of gift
Thus, the increase in basis can be calculated as follows:
gift tax paid • (FMV - basis)
increase in basis = amount of gift
This formula can be recast, by dividing each side of the equation by "total gift
tax paid," as:
increase in basis FMV - basis
gift tax paid = amount of gift
This reconstruction of the drafter's reasoning is, of course, the product of
my perceptions. However, to dispute the substantial accuracy of this historical
account, one must find more plausible that individuals with responsibility for
drafting tax provisions (1) were ignorant of (or simply ignored) basic and
longstanding elements of the income tax structure, such as that tax on appreci-
ation in a donor's property is transferred to the donee; and/or (2) fortuitously
adopted a mechanism effective for the drafter's purposes. I find it more plausi-
ble that section 1015(d)(6) was the product of a conscious and informed de-
sign. It strains credulity to attribute the precise effect of the words to chance.
My reconstruction of the reasoning that lay behind the words of section
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1015(d)(6) illustrates that the "plain meaning" of the words was an illusion.
The richness of the words, revealed by the study of the circumstances of their
enactment, demonstrates that even when the meaning seemed apparent, there
were relevant dimensions that I had not understood. In a transfer without any
consideration, different attributes of appreciation (increase in value in the
hands of the donor and amount of taxable gain assumed by the donee) are
merged in a single figure; the one is equal to the other, and the essentiality of
the one could be overlooked. In such a case, the meaning of the words is not
clear to the reader, but the same figure will satisfy either professionally plausi-
ble definition of appreciation. The factual context does not require identifica-
tion of the "real" meaning because no practical consequences flow from the
differences. The meaning is "plain" and uncontroversial because the words are
ambiguous, that is, a choice between competing definitions is unnecessary. The
facts do not prompt inquiry as to precise meaning and so it is unnecessary to
discuss which alternative is accurate and by what measure accuracy is to be
determined. However, the statutory purpose (saving the donee in income tax
the amount overpaid in gift tax) could be accomplished by the prescribed cal-
culations because appreciation is the measure of the gain on which the donee
assumes income tax liability, not because appreciation is the measure of the
increase in value of the property in the hands of the donor.
I have tried to identify how the drafter would have resolved a part-gift,
part-sale problem if it had been contemplated, but it is irrelevant whether any-
one involved in the drafting of section 1015(d)(6) had contemplated the type
of transaction postulated in Problem II. It is, in fact, unlikely. Although the
committee report accompanying section 1015(d) as originally enacted contem-
plated payment of gift taxes by the donee,"" conditional gifts were not ac-
knowledged in any discussion of section 1015(d)(6). Moreover, at the time
that the limitation was enacted, the Supreme Court had not yet resolved the
intercircuit conflict in favor of characterizing a conditional gift as a part-gift,
part-sale. 165 However, the problem raises issues that the evidence indicates
were considered, namely, the assumption of income tax liability by the donee,
which liability was ignored in valuing the gift for gift tax purposes. Inquiring
into how these issues were addressed reveals how the drafter intended the
words to apply to a situation such as Problem II, and renders unnecessary
speculation on what provision might have been drafted had the drafter con-
templated these particular circumstances.
Thus understood, section 1015(d)(6) can now be applied to Problem II.
Having inferred the drafter's purpose, I might proceed directly to adding to
the donee's basis an amount that would effect an income tax savings exactly
equal to the gift tax overpayment. However, inferring a purpose to compensate
for excess gift tax with income tax savings does not authorize me to adopt my
164. See supra note 132.
165. See Allen, Net Gift: When Does Donor Realize Taxable Income on the Gift Tax Paid by
Donee?. EST. PLAN., Spring 1976, at 130; Note, Donee Payment of Gift Tax: Crane, Old Colony
Trust, and the Need for Congressional Action, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1128, 1129-30 (1982).
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own formula to effect an income tax savings exactly equal to the gift tax over-
payment. Such is the distinction between construing a statute to promote its
purpose and inferring from the evidence of purpose the communicative content
of the words. The "plain meaning" of the words that prescribe the statutory
method of calculating the gift tax rate to be applied to the donee's taxable
gain (to determine the amount of the increase) has the effect of calculating the
overpayment of gift tax at the average, rather than marginal, gift tax rate.
The words employed and their arrangement are evidence that the average rate
was intended to substitute for actual marginal rate. As a result, the income
tax savings will fall short of compensating the donee for the overpayment of
gift tax when the average rate of gift tax is lower than the highest marginal
rate at which gift tax was paid. 6'
One might imagine that, if confronted with a choice between providing for
exact compensation (using the actual marginal rate) or providing less than
exact compensation, the drafter might have preferred the former. Perhaps the
drafter intended the statutory formula as a proxy for applying the actual mar-
ginal rate. To effectuate the inferred purpose to provide exact compensation, I
could substitute the actual gift tax rate for the quotient of "gift tax paid"
divided by "amount of the gift." However, the drafter did not employ the
words "gift tax rate," so I could hardly be said to be assigning the drafter's
meaning to those words, and I would be ignoring the words that were used,
"gift tax paid" and "amount of the gift," and the arrangement in which they
are presented. Absent more probative evidence than an extension of the infer-
ence that the function of the section 1015(d)(6) adjustment was to compensate
a donee for excess gift tax paid, I rely on the words employed and their ar-
rangement to conclude that rough justice (using the average gift tax rate)
rather than exact compensation (using the actual marginal gift tax rate) was
166. Once again referring to Problem I as an illustration, and positing that the full $200,000
fair market value of the gift was subject to gift tax but that gift tax assessed was $80,000, with
the 39% rate applicable to the first $100,000 and the 41% rate applicable to the rest, the gift
would be overvalued by $28,000 (28% income tax rate, multiplied by $100,000 taxable gain).
However, the overvaluation of the gift would cause an excessive gift tax liability of $11,480 (41%
x $28,000). Section 1015(d)(6) would authorize an addition of $40,000 to the son's $100,000
carryover basis, calculated as follows:
increase in basis = '$200,000 - 100,000
$80,000 $200,000
increase in basis = 1/2
$80,000
increase in basis = 1/2 ($80,000)
Because the formula has the effect of allowing an increase based on an average rate and not at the
rate the gift tax was actually imposed, the increase in basis of $40,000 under § 1015(d)(6) will
not allow sufficient income tax savings to compensate for the excess gift tax. The son's basis will
be $140,000 ($100,000 carryover basis, plus $40,000 increase). Gain on the sale of the property
will be $60,000 ($200,000 proceeds from sale at fair market value, minus $140,000 basis), result-
ing in an income tax liability of $16,800 (28% multiplied by $60,000). Section 1015(d)(6) thus
saves the son only $11,200 ($28,000 income tax liability without adjustment, minus $16,800 with
adjustment), rather than the full $11,480 overpayment of gift tax.
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intended. 6 7  The words used suggest that simplicity was valued over
precision.168
Because the remedy substantially accomplishes the purpose, the fact that
the remedy is imprecise in some cases does not negate the inference from stan-
dard cases and the committee explanation that the object of section
1015(d)(6) is to increase the donee's basis by the gift tax paid on the assumed
taxable gain to compensate in income tax savings the overpayment of gift
tax."' However, Problem II must be approached with respect for the remedy
provided as well as for the reason for the remedy.
In Problem II, the daughter assumed income tax liability on $200,000, cal-
culated without the section 1015(d)(6) adjustment. All of the assumed gain
represents increase in the value of the property in the hands of the donor be-
cause the mother has fully recovered her cost basis (and then some), although
$200,000 is less than the full increase (which would be the difference between
the mother's basis and the full fair market value of the property). "Net appre-
ciation," as the measure of the taxable gain assumed by the daughter, can be
understood to equal the $200,000 value transferred without consideration
("fair market value of the gift"), less the donor's zero basis allocated to the
gift ("donor's adjusted basis immediately before the gift"). "Amount of the
gift," that is, the amount subject to gift tax, and "fair market value of the
gift" serve different functions in the statutory formula, and the amount subject
to gift tax does not always equal the full value transferred without considera-
tion due to the annual exclusion.170 Here, however, the "amount of the gift"
167. There is some authority on this point. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-17-141 (Jan. 30, 1981)
(explaining that the gift tax "attributable to the net appreciation is determined by multiplying the
gift tax paid with respect to the gift by the net appreciation in value of the gift and dividing the
result by the amount of the gift").
168. Collins, supra note 4, at 950.
169. My colleague, Lash LaRue, made the following helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this paper:
To put this in Lord Coke's terms, the "remedy" chosen never perfectly matches the
"mischief." In Heydon's Case, the mischief was "long and unreasonable leases." ...
Parliament did not void such leases '[but instead] declared void those leases which
were made "when a prior life interest was then in being." By analogy, most statutes
pick off a part, not the whole of the mischief.
Letter from Lash LaRue to Gwen T. Handleman (March, 1990) (copy on file with author).
170. The distinction can be illustrated by altering the facts of Problem I slightly. As originally
posited, the entire $200,000 value of the property transferred was subject to gift tax. However,
due to the annual exclusion, the fair market value of the property and the amount subject to gift
tax may vary. If the property were valued at $210,000, and $10,000 were excluded from value
subject to gift tax under § 2503(b), net appreciation should be measured with reference to the full
fair market value ($210,000 - 100,000) because the role of "net appreciation" in the statutory
scheme is as a measure of the taxable gain that would be assumed by the donee subject to income
tax (absent the compensating adjustment). The "amount of the gift," as the figure used to deter-
mine the gift tax rate, must be set at the $200,000 value subject to gift tax. The son's income tax
liability on sale of the property at its fair market value ($210,000) would result in taxable gain of
$110,000 and an income tax liability of $30,800 (28% multiplied by $110,000), absent §
1015(d)(6). The gift would thus be overvalued by $30,800, resulting in an excess gift tax assess-
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also equals $200,000 because it is the amount that was subject to gift tax.
The section 1015(d)(6) adjustment, therefore, should be calculated as
follows:
increase in basis = $200,000 - 0
$80,000 $200,000
increase in basis = 1
$80,000
increase in basis = $80,000
The daughter's basis equals her $80,000 cost basis, plus the $80,000 section
1015(d)(6) increase, or $160,000. Upon sale of the property for its $280,000
fair market value, she will have taxable gain of $120,000 ($280,000 -
$160,000). At a 28% income tax rate, she has income tax liability of $33,600.
Absent the adjustment, her income tax liability would have been $56,000
(28% • ($280,000 - $80,000)). Thus, section 1015(d)(6) saved her $22,400
($56,000 - $33,600). However, the 1015(d)(6) adjustment yields an income
tax savings equal to less than the excess gift tax paid. The property was over-
valued for gift tax purposes by $56,000, the income tax liability the daughter
would bear on $200,000 gain at the 28% rate. That excess value was sub-
jected to gift tax at a rate of 41%, yielding an excess gift tax liability of
$22,960. Nonetheless, she is allowed a reduction in income tax equal only to
the average rate on the gift (40%) multiplied by the $56,000 overvaluation, or
$22,400 ($56,000 - $33,600).
By examining the result directed by the statutory terms in easy cases, to-
gether with contemporaneous explanations, I claim to have demonstrated that
(1) the object of the statute was to equalize the federal tax consequences be-
tween gifts of cash and gifts of property regarded as of equal after-tax value,
(2) the means employed to equalize the tax consequences was to effect an
income tax savings to the donee of property equal to the "overpayment" of gift
tax (the difference in the gift tax liability incurred on a transfer of cash com-
pared with a transfer of property of equal after-tax value), and (3) the reason-
ing that explains the efficacy of the words used in directing an adjustment that
ment of $12,012 (39% multiplied by $30,800). Section 1015(d)(6) effects $12,012 in income tax
savings by authorizing an increase in basis of $42,900, accomplished as follows:
increase in basis = $210,000 - 100,000
$78,000 $200,000
increase in basis = 11/20
$78,000
increase in basis - 11/20 ($78,000)
increase in basis = $42,900
The son's basis is equal to his $100,000 carryover basis, plus the $42,900 adjustment under §
1015(d), or $142,900. Upon sale of the property at $210,000, he will realize $67,100 in taxable
gain ($210,000 - $142,900), and assume a tax liability of $18,788 (28% multiplied by $67,100),
or $12,012 less than the $30,800 income tax liability he would have assumed absent § 1015(d).
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achieves the contemplated income tax savings reveals that the drafter em-
ployed the words with reference to particular dimensions of the concepts desig-
nated by the words. These dimensions are the key to defining the terms with
the precision required to address the part-gift, part-sale transaction.
However, the drafter's reasoning cannot be attributed to an entire body of
legislators. It is not plausible that more than a handful of individuals could
actually have read the words of section 1015(d)(6) with the precision that I
argue represents their communicative content, and there is no evidence that
the legislators were supplied with a coherent explanation. Nevertheless, infer-
ences can be drawn from the record of the enactment of section 1015(d)(6)
that the drafter's intent was accorded legislative authority. Section
1015(d)(6), along with another provision, was added to the Tax Reform Act
of 1976 in conference, with the following explanation: "the conferees agree
with and incorporate the explanation of those provisions contained in House
Report 94-1380 (the Ways and Means Committee Report on H.R. 14844),
except as modified by this statement." ' No modifying statement referred to
section 1015(d)(6). A majority of both houses of Congress voted in favor of
enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.17 The provision was mentioned
only briefly in the House Ways and Means Report incorporated into the con-
ference report, and, as noted above, the explanation was unenlightening. 7 3 I
have found no evidence in the records of the proceedings that any legislator
read the statutory language or even the report, let alone posed an objection.
Contrary to the assumptions of those who take the view that the words of the
statute in their plain meaning are what the legislators enacted, I find it im-
plausible to assume that the words of this particular provision were read by
many. Under such circumstances, a vote in favor of a provision can only be a
vote to allow the drafter to speak for the legislative body. Thus, in addition to
the inferences already drawn, I add the inference that a vote for this provision,
incorporated into a massive act including a multiplicity of controversial provi-
sions (of which this was assuredly not one), however motivated, was a vote to
defer to the judgment of the intellect that had designed the scheme. 7 "
171. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
172. Maltz, supra note 24, at 7 (commenting that "agreement among the legislators themselves
. . . should be the critical factor in statutory analysis").
173. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
174. Professor Daniel Farber, commenting on an earlier draft of this paper, asked whether I
meant to say that "lawyers or judges should discount [my] perfectly sensible interpretation" of §
1015(d)(6) if new evidence showed that my views conflicted with the hitherto "unknown secret
wishes of an unidentified scrivener." See Letter, supra note 83. I must answer that, while my
interpretation may be "sensible," no private practitioner would be entitled to decide that it is the
"law" in the face of evidence of the contrary view of a drafter delegated authority to frame the
terms offered for and accorded legislative approval.
I hold a reasoned belief (and that is the best I can say) that my interpretation is faithful to the
drafter's intent, and that is the only basis on which I can advance the interpretation as law. I do
not necessarily hold the view that it is the interpretation that best, in Professor Farber's terms,
"further[s] the sensible and just administration of the tax system." That is not for me to decide on
a tax return submitted with my pledge that the return reports tax liability in accordance with law.
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My enlightenment, however, admittedly rests on an understanding of the
"reason of the statute," and that understanding is a tissue of inferences. No
one can know with certainty what any author's intent or strategy might have
been; we can only invoke probabilities.175 Although my conclusions rest princi-
pally on circumstantial evidence, I believe my inferences are more probable
than the alternatives. My assertion that I have identified the communicative
content of section 1015(d)(6) rests on no more nor less certain grounds than
any conclusion about life experiences: the evidence supporting my conclusions
has the character of data that experience has taught is a reliable basis on
which to proceed. My conclusions have more the character of truth in that
sense (reliable evidence) than possessed by the alternative propositions (for
example, that there was no conscious awareness or that I have not identified
it). This does not make my conclusions true, but it does provide appropriate
grounds to proceed, when the alternatives are not to proceed or to proceed
without regard to what those with political authority might will. Regard is due
because I have no authority independently to supply answers to a client's ques-
tions about the scope of a taxpayer's obligations and entitlements, to impose
my policy vision, or to author statutory terms.
V. CONCLUSION
In an effort to justify appropriating the title to my own purposes, I read Zen
and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance,17 6 and I found that there was a cer-
tain similarity in the impressions we drew from the experience of attempting
to harmonize the lofty and the plebeian. The author recounts a nightmarish
series of incidents with motorcycle mechanics who not only failed to remedy
the problem for which he sought their assistance, but caused further damage.
Later, the author himself discovered that the malfunction was attributable to a
"little twenty-five-cent pin" that had broken.1 77 Reflecting on why the
mechanics had so "butchered" the job,178 he concluded that it was their lack
of involvement and care," 8 an attitude he also found pervaded computer
manuals, which he edited for a living. The manuals seemed to say: "Here is
the machine, isolated in time and in space from everything else in the universe.
It has no relationship to you, you have no relationship to it, other than to turn
certain switches, maintain voltage levels, check for error conditions communi-
cated [etc.]."'"8 In contrast, he really cared about fixing the motorcycle, get-
Whether a judge should favor the drafter's intent over a more "sensible" interpretation is another
matter. If I wish to submit the issue to such a politically authorized decisionmaker, I have the
option to report my interpretation with an explanation that it is advanced pursuant to a taxpayer's
right to have that issue resolved in the courts.
175. D'Amato, supra note 14, at 576.
176. R. PIRSIG, supra note 1.
177. Id. at 23.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 14.
180. Id. at 24-25.
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ting it to work, finding the source of the difficulty: "It was that attitude that
found it, nothing else."18'
Bingo. I know that feeling. I have not always known it. I did not have it in
law school when I first encountered section 1015(d)(6) and was satisfied to
plug in numbers from a simple hypothetical and reach an uncontroversial re-
sult. I was mildly curious as to why anyone should want to prescribe these
particular calculations, but I did not really care. Not enough to find it. Hap-
pily, a caring attitude was nurtured in me by those with whom I practiced,
and I value our association now more than ever. That is not to say that my law
school teachers did not try to inspire that ethic. Now I realize that at least
some of them did. But it is a gift that must be accepted to be complete.
181. Id.
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